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RETHINKING ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE:  
A NATURALISTIC COSMOPOLITAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Kevin T. Jackson* 
Abstract: This Article seeks to develop a frame of reference for compre-
hending legitimacy structures in emerging global economic governance 
regimes. To that end, it provides, in contradistinction from positivist and 
pragmatist approaches, an alternative normative justificatory framework 
for soft law. As its very name suggests, soft law is a law-like phenomenon, 
distinct from classical notions of law, yet no less significant, and hence 
worthy of receiving systematic moral analysis. It is therefore reasonable to 
draw upon philosophy of law as an intellectual resource for undertaking 
such a conceptual endeavor. Accordingly, this Article examines philoso-
phical justifications for evolving soft law syndicates that profess to impose 
obligations on business enterprises and other participants dealing with 
human rights and sustainability matters. The Article concludes that a 
naturalistic cosmopolitan jurisprudence that embraces the intrinsic value 
of rule of law and human rights provides a vital intellectual pathway for 
surmounting legitimacy gaps in global economic governance. 
Introduction 
 The global activities of business, governments, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and 
civil society are becoming increasingly interlaced.1 Growing global in-
terconnectivity is bringing about a head-on confrontation with tradi-
tional territorially-based principles for contemporary economic gov-
ernance associated with the Westphalian state system.2 Perhaps the 
most significant defiance of the territorial principle results from the 
 
* Professor of Law and Ethics at the Graduate School of Business, Fordham University. 
Daniel Janssen Chair, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium. The author is grate-
ful for the generous assistance of John James Liolos, Executive Articles Editor, and the 
editorial staff of the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. 
1 See David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction, in 
The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization De-
bate 1, 11 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000). 
2 See id. at 7–8. 
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mounting number of global issues involving sustainability and human 
rights.3 
 The emerging global economic governance regime is character-
ized by a transition away from a state-centered system toward a multiple-
actor system.4 Attending this transition is a fragmentation of authority 
and a blurring of lines that once delineated the public and private 
realms.5 Increasingly, private actors are operating in authoritative posi-
tions, fulfilling governing functions once perceived to be the exclusive 
domain of governments.6 
 If the boundaries separating the private and public sectors are 
shifting with respect to the concept of authority, logic suggests that they 
must do so with respect to responsibility as well. Consequently, private 
actors—particularly business enterprises—are increasingly called upon 
to share magnified public responsibilities7 for which they are held ac-
countable in large part through their reputations. 
 Meanwhile, significant cultural and ethical diversity exists within 
the ever-tightening world community, posing problems for understand-
ing cross-cultural standards for economic participants. For example, 
human rights and soft law civil regulations centered upon corporate 
social responsibility and sustainability are often portrayed as standing 
alongside hard international law standards in terms of their global 
reach and universal validity.8 The peculiar international responsibilities 
incorporated into global economic governance regimes represent a 
fertile ground for philosophical analysis that is sensitive to both the 
moral imperatives of the standards issuing from such regimes, and the 
practical realities facing contemporary business enterprises, nation-
states, and other participants in the world economic order. 
 The nature of contemporary global governance regimes raises a 
number of questions. Are the governance regimes authentic legal or-
ders, and if so, in what sense? If they are not genuine legal orders, do 
they nevertheless have legitimacy, and on what basis are such determi-
                                                                                                                      
3 Cf. Vinay Bhargava, Introduction to Global Issues, in Global Issues for Global Citi-
zens: An Introduction to Key Development Challenges 1, 2–3 (Vinay Bhargava ed., 
2006) (describing environmental and human rights issues as two of the main categories of 
global issues faced today). 
4 See Held & McGrew, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
5 See Stephen J. Kobrin, Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility: Transnational 
Politics, Transnational Firms and Human Rights, 19 Bus. Ethics Q. 349, 354 (2009). 
6 See id. (describing how the United Nations stopped relying on governmental support 
for HIV/AIDS prevention because private companies had greater resources). 
7 See id. at 350. 
8 See id. at 361–63. 
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nations made? Are the obligations imposed by the regime merely dis-
cretionary and voluntary, or is there some deeper sense in which they 
are mandatory and non-voluntary? 
 These questions are jurisprudential in the sense that, from a rule 
of law perspective, global economic governance should be committed 
to aligning economic power with justice.9 Law seeks to tame power—
whether that power arises from politics or from business—and convert 
it into authority through legitimizing principles such as democracy, 
separation of powers, human rights, and pursuit of the common 
good.10 The rule of law thereby serves to mediate relations between the 
rich and poor, the weak and powerful, and the majority and minori-
ties.11 Moreover, the rule of law acts as a constraint on capricious be-
havior, and sets limits on the otherwise arbitrary exercise of power.12 
Accordingly, the wider the gap between power and authority in global 
governance, the greater the international legitimacy deficit becomes.13 
 It is in light of such questions that this Article confronts the prob-
lem of constructing an adequate frame of reference from which to un-
derstand emerging global economic governance regimes. It aims to 
provide an alternative normative justificatory foundation for soft law. 
Because soft law is, as its name implies, at least a law-like phenomenon, 
it makes sense to turn to philosophy of law as an intellectual resource 
for such a conceptual project.14 This Article analyzes philosophical justi-
fications for emerging soft law syndicates that purport to establish obli-
gations for business enterprises and other participants toward civil regu-
lations touching upon sustainability and human rights responsibilities. 
 The dominant jurisprudential paradigms for law justification and 
interpretation are legal positivism, legal pragmatism (critical legal stud-
ies and law and economics approaches), and legal naturalism (law-as-
                                                                                                                      
9 Cf. Peter Muchlinski, Implementing the New Corporate Human Rights Framework, 22 Bus. 
Ethics Q. 145, 155 (2012) (arguing for a relationship between corporate responsibility 
and human rights). 
10 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law 32–36 (2004). 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 Cf. Political Legitimacy, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (Apr. 29, 2010), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/ (“Some associate legitimacy with the justification of co-
ercive power and with the creation of political authority. Others associate it with the justifi-
cation, or at least the sanctioning, of existing political authority.”). 
14 See Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 498, 
506 (2004). 
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integrity and natural law theories).15 After a background characteriza-
tion of emergent global governance regimes is provided in Part I, these 
paradigms are exposited with an eye to evaluating their respective ade-
quacy in offering justifications for such regimes and the standards issu-
ing from them. Part II identifies the following deficiencies of the para-
digms presented. First, despite its strong attraction as a model of na-
tional legal orders, positivism fails to align descriptive portrayal and 
normative justification as applied to global economic governance. Es-
pecially given that global economic governance goes to the heart of 
moral concerns surrounding sustainability and human rights matters, 
there is a demand for scholarship to recommend how governance 
schemes should be designed, and how participants in such regimes ought 
to act. Positivist viewpoints fail to bear in mind that even a limitless 
supply of factual data is insufficient to provide an “ought.”16 Second, 
pragmatism, taking the forms of critical legal studies and law and eco-
nomics, centers on dishing up narrow instrumental justifications of law, 
yet does so to the neglect of nourishing the sort of broader non-
instrumental justification that is demanded for standards with global 
reach and universal legitimacy.17 In the international context, pragma-
tist influence can be seen when the duty to comply with legal norms is 
treated in an instrumental and consequentialist way, such that discre-
tionary policy decisions by states and other global agents replace the 
rule of law.18 Law-as-integrity (one of the most respected contemporary 
                                                                                                                      
 
15 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Modera-
tion as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 707, 710, 716 (1991) (outlining several 
schools of legal thought invoked in the development of public law scholarship). 
16See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 393–94 (1945) (“[W]e must 
avoid the oft-repeated mistake of identifying the category of the ‘ought’ with the idea of 
the ‘good,’ ‘right,’ or ‘just’ in a material sense, if we wish to comprehend natural and posi-
tive law as normative and yet to maintain the distinction between them.”). 
17 Cf. id. at 349 (classifying matters that cannot be regulated by national law as norms 
of international law by necessity); Mark G. Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique 
of the Core Premises of “Law and Economics,” 35 J. Legal Educ. 274, 274–76 (1984) (noting 
that law and economics practitioners approach each analysis individually rather than 
broadly); Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical The-
ory, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 535, 535 (“Critical theorists often adopt the language and meth-
ods of pragmatism . . . .”). 
18 An example of discretionism occurring in place of binding commitment to rule of 
law is evident in memoranda written in support of the Bush administration’s decision to 
side-step constraints imposed by the Geneva Convention with regard to interrogation of 
detainees. The justification was framed in instrumentalist language: “Think about what you 
want to do when you have captured people from the Taliban and Al Qaeda. You want to 
interrogate them . . . . [I]t seems to me that if something is necessary for self-defense, it’s 
permissible to deviate from the principles of Geneva.” Interview: John Yoo, Frontline (Oct. 
18, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html; Jor-
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versions of legal naturalism), while avoiding the descriptive and in-
strumental deficiencies of positivism and pragmatism respectively, nev-
ertheless misrepresents the concept of law as encompassing only the 
restraint and legitimation of state coercion, particularly in the context 
of domestic legal orders.19 Yet emerging transnational soft law syndi-
cates increasingly fall outside of state-based and coercion-centered re-
gimes, and are addressed to international, not domestic agents.20 
 Building on this discussion, Part III provides an alternative natural-
istic paradigm for global economic governance grounded in a non-
instrumental regulative conception of rule of law and human rights. 
Stemming from philosophical roots in natural law theory, this paradigm 
situates the legitimation of global economic governance regimes in rela-
tion to three interconnected macro-juridic ideals: first, that of interna-
tional rule of law, distilled from mainstream accounts of rule of law 
chiefly formulated in connection with domestic legal systems, yet here 
abstracted to the global context; second, the concept of human rights as 
a form of higher, unwritten law; and third, the idea of the global com-
mon good. The Article concludes that rather than seeking to institute a 
centralized and coercive world-wide legal administration proceeding 
from an instrumental conception of law and deferring to the discretion 
and arbitrariness of power-driven state authorities, global economic 
governance should foster respect for the normative and intrinsically 
obligatory nature of decentralized norms, congruent with rule of law 
and human rights, and held in orbit around the global common good. 
I. Background of Emerging Regimes for Sustainability  
and Human Rights 
 Numerous trends are taking place today, demanding that some ac-
count be given of the legitimacy of global economic governance 
schemes and, at the same time, calling into question traditional ways of 
thinking about the responsibilities of economic actors on the world 
                                                                                                                      
dan Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret 
Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 345, 
356. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 303–311. 
20 See, e.g., Alessandro Bonanno, Globalization, Transnational Corporations, the State and 
Democracy, 12 Int’l J. Soc’y Agric. & Food 37, 37 n.3 (2004) (highlighting that transna-
tional organizations often fall outside state control and that international institutions often 
address these issues). 
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stage. First, the traditional role of “hard” public international law21 is 
met by the emergence of informal regulatory regimes and civil society 
arrangements.22 As the private sector is taking on more of a public 
character, private authorities are coming to occupy a more auspicious 
place in transnational economic regulation.23 
                                                                                                                     
 Second, in a departure from public international law’s traditional 
primary concern with matters of procedural justice in political and eco-
nomic affairs, the emergence of global governance regimes, which are 
aimed at engaging nongovernmental actors in the creation of public 
value,24 is ushering in some new pathways for bringing pressing issues of 
sustainability, corporate social responsibility, human rights, and matters 
of structural justice to bear on international economic affairs.25 
 As the recent global financial crisis, mounting concerns over 
global climate change, and similar trepidations over world poverty 
demonstrate, a variety of economic participants may act without any 
intention to do harm; indeed, they may not even be doing anything 
wrong in terms of conventional understandings, yet they may generate 
profound and sustained structural harms by carrying out ordinary be-
haviors.26 Structural injustice constitutes a type of wrongdoing separate 
and distinct from the misconduct of any individual actor or from the 
purposefully repressive policies or conduct of a single government.27 
Structural injustice comes about as a result of a multiplicity of actors 
fulfilling their respective functions and pursuing their interests and ob-
jectives within accepted norms and established institutional rules.28 
 
21 See Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in 
Commitment and Compliance 21, 31–37 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). Hard law refers to 
laws that are in some way binding. See id. In the context of international law, hard law 
refers to self-executing treaties or international agreements, along with customary laws. Cf. 
id. at 38–40 (stating that the content and intention of international agreements and 
practices is what makes those agreements and practices binding). Such instruments give 
rise to legally enforceable commitments on the part of nation-states and other subjects of 
international law. See id. 
22 See Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in the 
International System, in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance 3, 
4 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002). 
23 See id. at 9–13. 
24 John Donahue, On Collaborative Governance 1 ( John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Corpo-
rate Soc. Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 2, 2004). 
25 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model, Soc. 
Phil. & Pol’y, Jan. 2006, at 102, 114. 
26 See id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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 Hence, structural injustice places special demands on the problem-
solving capabilities of states, contributing to the “governance gap.”29 
The origins of the problems are complex and obscure, and extend past 
the reach of any given state. This returns to the idea mentioned above 
regarding the repudiation of the territorial principle, in line with the 
insight that it is a feature of global issues that they are solvable not by 
the efforts of any single nation, but only at a global level.30 
 Third, in contradistinction from traditional domestic legal re-
gimes, whose norms are, as legal positivist theories emphasize, enforced 
through centralized systems of sanctions, emergent “soft law”31 norms 
of “transnational new governance”32 seem more closely related to pub-
lic international law in the sense that they rely on decentralized en-
forcement mechanisms.33 But unlike hard public international law, the 
enforcement and governance of soft law does not rest on traditional 
institutions of public authority.34 Although corporate governance tradi-
tionally has been shaped by substantive law instituted by state authority, 
today’s transnational businesses perform their tasks within new confed-
erations of authorities.35 Spheres of authority that were historically re-
stricted to government are being shared with a multiplicity of non-state 
delegations.36 
                                                                                                                      
29 See Special Representative of the Sec’y Gen. on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnat’l Corps. and Other Bus. Enters., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Busi-
ness and Human Rights, Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 3, 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 
2008) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Protect, Respect and Remedy]. 
30 Bhargava, supra note 3, at 1. 
31 “Soft law” generally refers to non-binding, quasi-legal instruments, or to mecha-
nisms whose binding force is relatively weaker than conventional legal instruments. See 
David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibili-
ties for Corporations at International Law, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 931, 960 (2004); Alan C. Neal, 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Governance Gain or Laissez-Faire Figleaf?, 29 Comp. Lab. L. & 
Pol’y J. 459, 464 (2008). In international law parlance, “soft law” refers to international 
agreements not concluded as treaties and thus not yet binding. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-
Binding Norms in the International Legal System 100, 113–14 (Dinah Shelton ed., 
2003). In addition, “soft law” denotes a self-contained set of obligations arising out of the 
occasional preference of nation-states to reach non-binding agreements and to pattern 
relations in ways that avoid application of treaty or customary law. Hartmut Hillgenberg, A 
Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 499, 501 (1999). 
32 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 
501, 501 (2009). 
33 See id. at 506. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. at 505. 
36 See id. at 505–06. 
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 Fourth, there have been significant changes in the past several 
decades in the way business has been conducted.37 With the advent of 
policies such as deregulation, liberalization, and privatization, and their 
propagation across the planet in the 1980s and 1990s, a change came 
about in the structure and the size of the global marketplace, together 
with a shift in power relations in the global political economy.38 
 Within this dynamic, states are relinquishing some of their power 
in both domestic and international spheres.39 It is against this backdrop 
that the efficacy of states as exclusive guardians of fundamental rights 
has been called into question.40 Further, calls for expanding responsi-
bility for sustainability and human rights to non-state participants and 
into the private domain have intensified.41 
 Yet it remains unclear how and to what extent a broadening of 
such responsibilities into the private arena can and should occur. Espe-
cially from the standpoint of international law, these protracted inter-
pretations of non-state responsibilities toward sustainability and human 
rights appear to be raising more questions than providing definitive 
answers. Ordinarily states are taken to be the only entities to which an 
international legal personality is ascribed, rendering them the sole ad-
dressees of international law.42 By extension, then, they are the exclu-
sive bearers of direct international legal obligations.43 Consequently 
other institutions carry indirect responsibilities, with regard to human 
rights for instance, insofar as the respective states specify them in mu-
nicipal law.44 Nevertheless, they are not considered as obligated directly 
by international law.45 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Douglass Cassel, Human Rights and Business Responsibilities in the Global Marketplace, 
11 Bus. Ethics Q. 261, 265–66 (2001). 
38 See generally Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, Foreign Aff., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 50 (de-
scribing the devolution of influence and authority from states to NGOs in the last fifty 
years). 
39 See Hall & Biersteker, supra note 22, at 4. 
40 Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, Looking Beyond the State but Not Ignoring It: A Framework of 
Analysis for Non-State Actors and Human Rights, in Non-State Actors in the Human 
Rights Universe 3, 4–6 (George Andreopoulos, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, & Peter Juviler 
eds., 2006). 
41 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 1 
(2006); Philip Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights 5–6 (2005); Arat, supra 
note 40, at 5–6; see also Dawn Oliver & Jörg Fedtke, Human Rights and the Private 
Sphere: A Comparative Study 9–13 (2007). 
42 See Hall & Biersteker, supra note 22, at 3. 
43 See id. 
44 Muchlinski, supra note 9, at 150–51. 
45 Id. at 151. 
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 Thus, a good deal of the inquiry into the nature and authority of 
soft law regimes pivots around the question of the sufficiency of state-
centrism or governmental exclusivity regarding initiatives for sustain-
ability and human rights.46 Consequently, at a point where authority 
and power are split up and pooled between state and non-state agents, 
and where partitions between the private and the public domains are 
falling away, the challenge at the core of the business and human rights 
debate is becoming one of reinterpreting and redesigning global eco-
nomic governance regimes to include and expect—if not outright de-
mand—heightened levels of responsibility from non-state actors, espe-
cially corporations.47 
 Within the sphere of transnational new governance, civil regula-
tions are normally interpreted as existing alongside nation-states, rather 
than inside of a state structure.48 The advent of soft law’s regulatory 
influence outside nations’ regulatory schemes has empowered transna-
tional non-state actors.49 The upshot is that the private sector has as-
sumed a much more prominent public position, and private authori-
ties’—especially corporations’—role in transnational economic regula-
tion is intensifying.50 As mentioned previously, the regulatory power of 
the state is undergoing extensive decentralization under the influence 
of globalization.51 Blendings of state and market, public and private, 
and traditional and self-regulatory institutional structures, character-
ized by collaborations among states, NGOs, and companies, are sup-
plementing the traditional style of hierarchically ordered regulation.52 
 Public policy that used to be created and enforced at the domestic 
level through official regulatory organs, such as environmental boards 
and employment nondiscrimination panels, is being conducted instead 
at the global level by means of dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation 
                                                                                                                      
46 See, e.g., Lawrence S. Finkelstein, What Is Global Governance?, 1 Global Governance 
367, 367–68 (1995) (stating that problems such as human rights need to be solved by pri-
vate actors in addition to governments). 
47 Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 29, ¶¶ 1–8. 
48 Virginia Haufler, Globalization and Industry Self-Regulation, in Governance in a 
Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition 226, 226 (Miles Kahler & David 
A. Lake eds., 2003). 
49 See Virginia Haufler, The Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-
Regulation in a Global Economy 12–15 (2001); Hall & Biersteker, supra note 22, at 3–4. 
50 See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduc-
tion, in The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance 1, 11–14 (Lester 
M. Salamon & Odus V. Elliott eds., 2002). 
51 See O’Connell, supra note 31, at 101. 
52 See Lobel, supra note 14, at 498 (discussing employment disputes, organizational 
compliance, financial regulation, and employee misconduct). 
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between public and private sectors. 53 Thus, global business regulatory 
instruments are undergoing transformation.54 Global business regula-
tion is no longer limited to administrative and legislative activity.55 It 
encompasses market-oriented agents that impose business disclosure, 
monitoring, reporting, and transparency requirements, backed with 
reputation sanctions to address corporate malfeasance.56 
 Civil regulations, however, do not displace the governing activities 
of nation-states.57 Instead, they institute governance systems within 
wider global structures of social capacity and agency.58 The advent of 
civil regulation signals the emergence of a global “governance trian-
gle,” an arrangement in which nation-states represent only one among 
multiple sources of global regulatory authority.59 
 Prompted by the rise of economic globalization in the 1990s, the 
notion of governance sans government began appearing in scholarly 
work, underscoring the changes that globalization introduces in the 
governance structure of international society.60 The word “governance” 
designates the activities of self-organizing systems that stand alongside 
the hierarchies and markets within which government structures are 
contained.61 Building upon that idea, the locution “global governance” 
refers to the expansion of the sphere of influence of governing struc-
tures to entities beyond nation-states that do not possess sovereign au-
thority.62 It is important to recognize the conceptual distinction be-
tween governance and government. In contradistinction from the idea 
of government, which is associated with authoritative and centralized 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Con-
temporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 371–76 (2004); see also David Hess, Social 
Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability 
Through Transparency, 17 Bus. Ethics Q. 453, 455 (2007). 
54 See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. Econ. J. 644, 
658–59 (1989). 
55 See Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law 
39–40 (1983); O’Connell, supra note 31, at 110. 
56 See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: An Experi-
mental Approach, 2 Reg. & Governance 165, 165–68 (2008). 
57 See John Gerard Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors and Prac-
tices, 10 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 499, 519 (2004). 
58 Id. 
59 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards, 
Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in The Politics of Global Regulation 44, 48–50 
(Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009). 
60 See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 46, at 367–68 (defining “governance”). 
61 See R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 Pol. Stud. 
652, 660 (1996). 
62 Finkelstein, supra note 46, at 369. 
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control of the state, governance connotes a process founded on ab-
sence of centralized forms of governmental authority.63 Ideally, global 
governance undertakes the role within the international realm that 
governments characteristically assume within the nation-state.64 
 Some scholars suggest that global governance should be under-
stood as a fusion of public, private, and civil-society organizations in-
volved in a shared endeavor, where the term “governance” conveys a 
“public” meaning expressive of the sort of function that governments 
typically have assumed.65 International economic actors that are per-
ceived by civil society as legitimate are “governmental” in the way in 
which they exercise social control by promulgating norms (standards of 
behavior) and laws (rules of behavior).66 Global economic governance 
regimes—not unlike national governments—represent structures of 
authority that rest on institutionalized international practices and gen-
erally accepted norms.67 Indeed, nongovernmental bodies are morally 
comparable to governmental bodies in the sense that both “are ex-
pected to be accountable and open to opposition.”68 Otherwise they will 
tend to suffer an erosion of their legitimacy.69 Whether we are speaking 
of transnational companies such as Google, NGOs such as Amnesty In-
ternational, or IGOs such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), or-
ganizations’ authority to expound the virtues of social responsibility, 
good governance and moral accountability to others will be gravely 
compromised by any departures from these values that crops up in their 
own behavior. 
 Thus, although efforts aimed at global governance are being un-
dertaken by a variety of private and public actors across the spectrum of 
civil society, it is this public character underlying the idea of govern-
ance that triggers this Article’s inquiry into whether and to what extent, 
when global economic governance takes place, it does so under color 
of the rule of law. This demand for broad juridical justification is par-
ticularly insistent given that global governance purports to deal au-
                                                                                                                      
63 See Rhodes, supra note 61, at 657. 
64 See James N. Rosenau, Citizenship in a Changing Global Order, in Governance With-
out Government: Order and Change in World Politics 272, 286–87 ( James N. 
Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992). 
65 Donahue, supra note 24, at 2. 
66 See Rhodes, supra note 61, at 652–55. 
67 See id. 
68 Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 Int’l Org. 379, 383 
(1999). 
69 See id. 
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thoritatively with international human rights, which are distinctively 
moral and juridical concepts resting at the core of the rule of law.70 
 With this background in mind, we may examine a trio of jurispru-
dential models to deepen inquiry into soft law regimes, especially re-
garding these regimes’ congruence with rule of law and human rights. 
These models are legal positivism, legal pragmatism, and natural rights 
theory. 
II. Jurisprudential Paradigms for Global  
Economic Governance 
A. Legal Positivism (Descriptive View of Law) 
 A positivist approach to law holds that all law must be posited by some 
sort of institution.71 It denies that there is any natural dimension to law.72 
Correspondingly, positivism claims that all rights are positive rights.73 Jer-
emy Bentham famously decried that “[n]atural rights is simple nonsense: 
natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon 
stilts.”74 
 Positivism recognizes as valid only those obligations and rights that 
are identifiable as a matter of brute fact based on empirical criteria, 
such as actual conventions and practices of a determinate community.75 
Positivism therefore would proceed from a “scientific” conception of 
soft law, being concerned only with its descriptive features, not its moral 
legitimacy.76 
1. Austin’s Command Theory 
 John Austin’s version of positivism is known as the “command the-
ory.” Austin argues that it is up to jurisprudence to separate “improp-
                                                                                                                      
70 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 Minn. J. Int’l L. 223, 258–59, 262 
(2011) (discussing, inter alia, flaws in global governance, “that global governance regimes 
can manifest the ‘international rule of law,’” and noting that international lawyers and 
human rights advocates often consider the erosion of national sovereignty as progress 
toward the goals of human rights). 
71 See Irma J. Kroeze, Legal Positivism, in Jurisprudence 62, 65–66 (Christopher Roe-
derer & Darrel Moellendorf eds., 2004). 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 Jeremy Bentham, Nonsense upon Stilts, in Rights, Representation and Reform: 
Nonsense Upon Stilts and Other Writings on the French Revolution 317, 330 
(Philip Schofield et al. eds., 2002). 
75 See Kroeze, supra note 71, at 66, 68–70. 
76 See id. 
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erly” called laws from “properly” called laws.77 In the former category, 
Austin places scientific laws of nature and moral laws.78 The latter cate-
gory constitutes the commands of the sovereign.79 
 A “command” for Austin is an intention that a person act or not 
act in some manner.80 Moreover, a command entails a threat of harm 
to the person who declines to obey that intention.81 The sovereign 
command places a duty to obey upon the greater part of the popula-
tion which is under the sovereign’s authority.82 This duty to obey does 
not arise out of the morality or legitimacy of the command, but rather, 
out of the source of the command itself.83 
                                                                                                                     
 Regarding judge-made law, Austin argues that a court’s authority 
to issue the sovereign command stems from the jurisdiction given the 
court by the sovereign.84 For Austin, law is identified by reference to 
the obedient acts of the bulk of society carried out in accordance with 
the dictates of political superiors, who are themselves habitually obeyed 
and do not habitually obey anyone else.85 The commands of the sover-
eign are the laws of the state.86 Although the question of whether the 
commands of the sovereign are moral or not remains important for 
Austin, he does not consider it to be a legal question.87 In Austin’s fa-
mous maxim, “[t]he existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit 
is another.”88 
2. Kelsen’s “Pure” Theory 
 According to Hans Kelsen, a legal norm is valid if it can be derived 
from a valid higher norm which is ultimately derived from the “basic 
norm.”89 The basic norm determines which norms are legally valid and 
 
77 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the 
Study of Jurisprudence 9–10 (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1954) 
(1832). 
78 Id. at 12–13. 
79 Id. at 34. 
80 See id. at 13–14. 
81 See id. at 14. 
82 See id. at 24–25. 
83 See Austin, supra note 77, at 24–25. 
84 Id. at 31. 
85 See id. at 193–94. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. at 184. 
88 See id. 
89 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law 31 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 
1967) (1966). 
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also justifies why they should be obeyed.90 Kelsen writes, “[b]y the word 
‘validity’ we designate the specific existence of a norm.”91 And, in addi-
tion: 
To say that a norm is “valid” . . . means something else than 
that it is actually applied and obeyed; it means that it ought to 
be obeyed and applied, although it is true that there may be 
some connection between validity and effectiveness. A general 
legal norm is regarded as valid only if the human behavior 
that is regulated by it actually conforms with it, at least to 
some degree.92 
 For Kelsen, the existence of a valid norm implies that there is a 
duty to obey that norm.93 Kelsen argues that the duty to obey may be 
implied by casting legal norms into the following logical form: if A is, 
then B ought to be.94 This form of rule does not itself create a duty. 
Rather, the duty derives from the negation of a delict.95 Thus, Kelsen 
states that “the statement that somebody is legally obligated (has a legal 
duty) to behave in a certain way, refers to a behavior which is the oppo-
site of the behavior that is the condition of a coercive act as a sanc-
tion.”96 It does not make sense to speak of what someone “ought” to 
do, for, according to Kelsen’s formulation, an official is directed to im-
pose a sanction only when some delict is committed.97 As Kelsen states: 
“legal obligation is not . . . the behavior that ought to be. Only the co-
ercive act, functioning as a sanction, ought to be.”98 
                                                                                                                     
 Under Kelsen’s theory, the validity of a norm comes from some 
higher norm, and not directly from any empirical fact.99 To render the 
positive legal order meaningful, Kelsen presupposes a basic norm which 
gives validity to a hierarchy of legal norms, despite the fact that the basic 
norm is not itself a part of the legal system.100 Introducing the basic 
 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 10. 
92 Id. at 10–11. 
93 Id. 
94 See id. at 115. 
95 See Kelsen, supra note 89, at 111. 
96 Id. at 119. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. (footnote omitted). Under Kelsen’s theory, it is unclear how a citizen can ever be 
said to have a “duty” since there is apparently no “law” to be followed or transgressed. See 
id. Rather, the citizen may simply act in such a way that will direct officials to enforce cer-
tain sanction against him or her. See id. 
99 See id. at 201. 
100 See id. at 203–05. 
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norm into a coercive order brings legitimacy to that order.101 It thereby 
becomes a legal order and may be distinguished from, say, the merely 
coercive order of Austin.102 For Kelsen, the legal order becomes com-
prehensible only when a conceptual framework is brought to it.103 That 
is, the conceptual act of presupposing the basic norm enables one to 
interpret a particular coercive order as being a legal system.104 
3. Hart’s “Rule of Recognition” Theory 
 Similar in function to Kelsen’s basic norm is H.L.A. Hart’s “rule of 
recognition,” which establishes a criterion of validity for other rules and 
norms without any reference to their content.105 Hart’s rule of recogni-
tion also allows legal orders to be distinguished from merely coercive 
orders.106 Whereas for Kelsen the basic norm remains something that 
must be brought to the coercive order to make it a legal order, Hart’s 
rule of recognition belongs to the legal system by virtue of brute social 
fact.107 Although the rule of recognition may determine the validity of 
a given rule, it may not determine the validity of the system conceived 
as a whole.108 
                                                                                                                     
 A legal system exists for Hart when there is a union of primary and 
secondary rules, and a majority of a social group generally obeys pri-
mary rules while officials take an internal view of secondary rules.109 
Although the rule of recognition is within the legal system, it cannot be 
valid or invalid.110 It is instead purely a matter of social fact.111 As Hart 
writes: 
We only need the word ‘validity’, and commonly only use it, to 
answer questions which arise within a system of rules where 
the status of a rule as a member of the system depends on its 
satisfying certain criteria provided by the rule of recognition. 
No such question can arise as to the validity of the very rule of 
recognition which provides the criteria; it can neither be valid 
 
101 See Kelsen, supra note 89, at 205. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. at 204–05. 
104 See id. 
105 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 97 (Clarendon Law Series 1992) (1961). 
106 See id. at 20–25. 
107 See id. at 97; Kelsen, supra note 89, at 204–05. 
108 See Hart, supra note 105, at 103–04. 
109 See id. at 111–14. 
110 Id. at 107. 
111 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
54 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:39 
nor invalid but is simply accepted as appropriate for use in 
this way.112 
Hart’s emphasis is on the existence of the rule of recognition—either it 
exists or it does not—whereas Kelsen stresses the validity of the basic 
norm—it is either presupposed to be valid or it is not.113 Hart distin-
guishes the rule of recognition from the basic norm so that one can 
discern whether or not a legal rule really exists.114 A rule will exist when 
it is “valid given the system’s criteria of validity.”115 
 Thus, Hart is concerned with what is meant by the claim that a 
given rule is valid within a particular system of law, whereas Kelsen is 
concerned with how to determine whether a given coercive order can 
be said to be within a system of law.116 Accordingly, the rule of recogni-
tion is internal to the legal system, while the basic norm is external to 
the system.117 
4. Positivism’s View of International Law 
 The above-mentioned influential positivist thinkers typically have 
taken exaggerated stances on the legal status of international law.118 At 
one extreme the positivist skeptics of international law, such as Hart, 
see all international legal norms either as mere “positive morality” or as 
a kind of “primitive” or “quasi” variety of defective law.119 Some positiv-
ists offer more nuanced interpretations that make distinctions about 
the legal status of different kinds of instruments within the realm of 
international law, such as treaties between states, recognized as genuine 
sources of international law, and others, such as non-treaty agreements 
between states, as mere “pré-droit.”120 
                                                                                                                      
 
112 Hart, supra note 105, at 105–06. 
113 See id. at 107; Kelsen, supra note 89, at 193. 
114 Hart, supra note 105, at 245. 
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116 See id. at 107; Kelsen, supra note 89, at 108. 
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118 See Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 185 (1990). 
119 Austin, supra note 77, at 125–26; see Hart, supra note 105, at 3–4. 
120 Hillgenberg, supra note 31, at 502. For example, Hartmut Hillgenberg states that 
“‘[s]oft law’ may sometimes be ‘pré-droit’ in the sense that it leads to treaty obligations.” Id. 
Hillgenberg’s positivist assumption throughout the article is that only commitments be-
tween states (i.e., treaty agreements) are “sources of law.” Id. at 506. So long as non-treaty 
agreements, even those between states, 
are not recognized in international law as a source of legal obligations and 
are not provided with a set of rules regulating their coming into existence, 
functioning and effects, they remain ‘closed.’ Outside the regime created by 
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 At the other extreme, positivist anti-skeptics argue that because 
international law bears many empirical similarities to domestic law (for 
example, existence of de facto enforcement mechanisms or sanctions), it 
must be “law” after all.121 Taking a positivist jurisprudential stance 
might seem promising in our comprehension of soft law, because soft 
law is often “enforced” through reputational sanctions that—although 
decentralized and delivered more by the various elements of civil soci-
ety than by states—often substantially reinforce civil regulations, and 
international law in general.122 Although this Article will discuss the 
connection between reputational sanctions and pragmatist accounts, 
this Section needs only to note their relevance to positivist portrayals. 
 Although today’s emerging civil regulations are in some respects 
dissimilar to traditional hard law enforcement regimes, wherein non-
compliance with rules is met with imposition of sanctions, they are nev-
ertheless arguably tied to what might be termed a “rule of reputation,” 
which in its own way links accountability for norms to informal sanc-
tions and rewards that affect reputation capital.123 
 The concept of reputation capital recognizes that social expecta-
tions of corporate responsibility are intensifying.124 When civil regula-
tions are breached, the breaches can cause direct reputational harm, 
triggered by perceptions across civil society that important social con-
tracts have been breached, and consequently a reduction in corporate 
                                                                                                                      
the non-treaty agreements, rules of international law presently take account 
of such agreements only as a factor, not as a source, of law. 
Id. at 515. 
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18 Immutable Laws of Corporate Reputation 17 (2004) (stating guidelines for manag-
ing corporate reputation); Charles J. Fombrun, Reputation: Realizing Value from 
the Corporate Image 1 (1996) (illustrating the importance of reputation in business). 
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reputation assets results.125 On the other hand, when expectations are 
satisfied from compliance with civil regulations, a firm’s reputation 
capital is preserved or even increased.126 Accordingly, many states, cor-
porations, IGOs, and NGOs are drawn toward compliance with soft law 
because compliance enhances their reputation as respected actors on 
the global stage.127 From a jurisprudential perspective, legitimacy par-
tially compensates for the absence of enforcement mechanisms, thus 
justifying a positive reassessment of the effectiveness of soft law and ex-
plaining patterns of seemingly voluntary compliance with soft law 
norms and international obligations.128 
 The notion of reputation capital has grown to prominence along-
side the ideal of free-market capitalism, which has undergone adjust-
ment with civil society increasingly setting its eyes on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR).129 Corporate commitments to CSR are being rein-
forced by an emerging constellation of global civil regulations.130 In 
legal positivist terms, the cash value of “sanctions” handed down for 
noncompliance with civil standards is reckoned as reputational loss.131 
Reputational gain is the incentive for complying with the standards.132 
Accordingly, emerging “accountability regimes” sanction corporations 
for breaches of their CSR.133 
 To summarize this discussion of legal positivism’s approach to 
transnational governance, positivist skeptics and anti-skeptics are polar-
ized by how they answer whether international law is really “law.”134 In 
the final analysis, however, this question amounts to something of a red 
herring because the question of legality is not simply a descriptive or 
empirical issue, as positivists would have it, but rather a normative issue 
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as well. As such, the question is not resolvable only by reference to facts, 
but also engages ethical concepts and moral argumentation. 
 Such positivist accounts of law also wrongly equate features and 
conditions taken as appropriate for analysis of the validity of domestic 
law with features and conditions pertaining to the validity of (hard) in-
ternational law, and by extension, soft law configurations as well.135 Ad-
ditionally, they are misled in the way they treat legal validity itself.136 
Whatever the merits of positivist theories in articulating prominent fea-
tures of valid national law, such as enforceability, centrality of enact-
ment, and rule-like character, there is no core of features constituting 
what law “really” is.137 At best, some features of legality are more or less 
typical of what we deem clear instances of law. Thus, positivist constru-
als of general international law that attempt to clarify the target of their 
investigation by appealing to fundamental criteria such as state consent 
and customary practice—themselves obscure notions—are in the end 
explaining obscurum per obscurius.138 Gaining a conceptual grasp on the 
complex status of international legal validity in its manifold forms need 
not involve the assumption of a single fundamental test any more than 
would be necessary for treating the concept of legal validity in domestic 
law.139 
 Even if positivist characterizations of domestic law as the command 
of the sovereign, or as relatively centralized systems derivable from a 
basic norm, are accepted arguendo as accurate ones, it simply does not 
follow that such characterizations are sufficient as definitions for law in 
all of its possible applications.140 It is one thing to make an adverse 
comparison between what are taken to be essential features of domestic 
law on the one hand, and international law or even soft law on the 
other.141 It is quite a different assertion, however, to say that domestic 
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law and soft law belong in completely different classes, and to further 
conclude that the former is entitled to classification as law and the lat-
ter not.142 There may be great differences between two objects of the 
same general class—delivery trucks and motorcycles for example—but 
it does not follow logically from a descriptive listing of the many em-
pirical differences between these two kinds of objects that they are not 
both properly understood as vehicles.143 Granted, they are quite differ-
ent kinds of vehicles in terms of their specific properties, but they still 
share the same status as vehicles. For our purposes in seeking a juris-
prudential paradigm suitable for understanding global economic gov-
ernance regimes, we may note that these theoretical inadequacies for 
an account of international law turn out to be magnified regarding in-
ternational soft law. 
B. Legal Pragmatism (Instrumental View of Law) 
 Alongside positivism, another viewpoint, one that may be termed 
legal pragmatism, derives from a number of different theories of law 
that originated in the legal realist school.144 The two most prominent 
pragmatist approaches in contemporary jurisprudence are critical legal 
studies and law and economics.145 Pragmatist theories accept in com-
mon the premise that, whether one is considering a domestic or inter-
national context, all that law can ever amount to is policy.146 Pragma-
tism is grounded in an instrumental mindset that conceives of the na-
ture of law as simply a decision process, not as a coherent system of 
rules.147 To the extent that law engages rules it does so only to promote 
the utilitarian objective of generating desired outcomes.148 The author-
ity of such rules derives from their effectiveness in realizing such out-
comes.149 
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1. Critical Legal Studies 
 As a postmodernist portrayal of law, the school of critical legal 
studies (CLS) comprehends law as a form of “discourse” lacking objec-
tive moral legitimacy, or as a collection of indeterminate pronounce-
ments incapable of being rendered sufficiently determinate by a con-
cept such as the rule of law.150 Some of the more radical skeptics of 
law151—following the work of Foucault,152 Derrida,153 and other oppo-
nents of modernity—attack efforts to apply the concept of law to the 
sphere of politics, and even reject the notion of law as a coherent foun-
dation for human coordination and collaboration.154 At its best, law 
amounts to no more than a self-referential amalgam of symbols for 
which meaning is utterly obscure and drastically indeterminate.155 At its 
worst, law is a kind of malicious discourse that both creates and ration-
alizes political arrangements for human subjugation.156 One scholar 
characterizes the CLS indictment of incoherence and contradiction 
against the rule of law in terms of three propositions: the patchwork 
thesis, the duck-rabbit thesis, and the truncation thesis.157 
a. Patchwork Proposition 
 According to the patchwork proposition, the occurrence of “gaps, 
conflicts, and ambiguities” in legal rules requires deployment of gen-
eral principles to “patch together” (for instance, render consistent and 
coherent) the resultant imperfections in the fabric of legal doctrine.158 
Because principles remain indeterminate due to their generality, how-
ever, the patchwork thesis maintains that no “rational reconstruction” 
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for legal doctrine can render it consistently integrated by one moral 
outlook.159 Hence, the high degree of indeterminacy about the law is 
criticized as unacceptable for the rule of law.160 Moreover, the contra-
dictions in legal doctrine embodied in its patchwork normative texture 
are grounded in “starkly incompatible ethical viewpoints.”161 This is 
reflected, for instance, in the extremes of individualism on the one 
hand and altruism on the other.162 
 
                                                                                                                     
 The kind of international legal doctrine associated with interpreta-
tions of soft law civil regulations and with human rights interpretations 
are within the scope of the patchwork thesis.163 Gaps in doctrine occur 
when, for instance, one country ratifies human rights legislation while 
another does not.164 One example of this was the United States’ refusal 
to subscribe to the World Health Organization’s infant formula code, 
which regulates marketing practices for breast milk substitutes in de-
veloping countries, despite its acceptance by 118 other nations.165 Con-
flicts arise when a party cannot comply with two treaties simultaneously, 
as one treaty prohibits what is allowed in the other or requires an oppo-
site course of action.166 
 Other conflicts exist when a single economic actor, such as a cor-
poration, is faced with contradictory mandates depending on the coun-
try (home or host) in which it is operating.167 A case involving Dresser 
Industries, a company based in the United States with a subsidiary in 
France, illustrates this situation.168 U.S. law imposed sanctions against 
subsidiaries of U.S. firms for selling equipment to the former Soviet 
Union for a gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe.169 French 
law, on the other hand, ordered Dresser of France to honor its contract 
to supply gas compressors.170
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 Other instances involving conflicts require judgment concerning 
the respective weighing of opposing authorities, such as conflict be-
tween the WTO system and Multilateral Environmental Agreements.171 
Conflicts may also arise where WTO rules conflict with other provisions 
of public international law, and where other tribunals make concurring 
claims.172 Ambiguities appear when human rights standards are broadly 
stated, and thus amenable to differing interpretations depending on 
ideological orientation, level of economic development, and the na-
tional legal environment of the host country.173 
 The problem of uncertainty has a special significance in interpre-
tations of soft law. Where there is substantial uncertainty about the con-
ventions of nation-states concerning, for example, the exercise of dip-
lomatic asylum, courts will find that no custom exists upon which to 
predicate a binding obligation.174 One should notice in this regard that 
the concept of uncertainty is a relative one, used to distinguish binding 
customs from practices that do not have substantial uniformity.175 
b. “Duck-Rabbit” Premise 
 The “duck-rabbit”176 premise asserts that “the structure of legal 
doctrine can be organized in radically different ways, depending upon 
which of two incompatible ethical viewpoints one adopts.”177 
 Regarding the international relevance of CLS, it is perhaps more 
apt to identify the dominant tension between rival ethical traditions not 
so much as a conflict between the extremes of individualism and altru-
ism (as in the Kennedy178 and Unger179 works), but as a conflict be-
tween standards of developed versus developing countries, or between 
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the “global north” and “global south.”180 The recurrent debates be-
tween developed and developing country representatives transpiring at 
the Earth Summits are illustrative.181 
 The debate that surrounded the proposed United Nations (UN) 
Code of Conduct for Transnational Enterprises was dominated by a 
conflict over whether international norms from the traditional concep-
tion of international law (customary law of state responsibility) and 
from “international obligations” (for example, treaties, conventions, 
and agreements based on the express consent of the concerned states) 
would, on one hand, tend to favor the interests of developed market-
economy countries, or, on the other hand, favor the interests of devel-
oping countries.182 In general, developing nations tended to agree on 
the need to stimulate their economies by permitting free trade and pri-
vate enterprise to flourish.183 Nevertheless, they remained skeptical 
about the perceived ability of developed nations to manipulate interna-
tional law to their own benefit and advantage, with a resultant prejudi-
cial impact on developing countries.184 The counterargument ad-
vanced by representatives of the developed countries at times was that 
the sheer number of developing countries would provide them great 
ability to actively shape the evolution of international law to their bene-
fit.185 Further, the argument maintained that the trend in emerging 
                                                                                                                      
180 See Lawrence Susskind, Barriers to Effective Environmental Treaty-Making, in Barriers 
to Conflict Resolution 293, 293 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995). 
181 See id. 
182 Detlev F. Vagts, U.N. Ctr. on Transnat’l Corps., The Question of a Refer-
ence to International Obligations in the United Nations Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations: A Different View, at iii, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/2, 
U.N. Sales No. E.86.II.A.11 (1986). 
183 See Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of Conduct: A 
Study of the Relationship Between International Legal Cooperation and Economic Development, 10 
Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1275, 1276, 1287 (1995) (noting in a Code of Conduct post-adoption 
context developing states’ prior “aspirations . . . to build viable self-sustaining and competi-
tive economies”). 
184 See Patrick Robinson, U.N. Ctr. on Transnat’l Corps., The Question of a Ref-
erence to International Law in the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transna-
tional Corporations, at 4, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/1, U.N. Sales No. E.86.II.A.5 
(1986). 
185 See Louis Emmerij & Richard Jolly, The UN and Transnational Corporations 1–2 (UN 
Intellectual History Project, Briefing Note No. 17, 2009), available at http://www.unhistory. 
org/briefing/17TNCs.pdf (reviewing Tagi Segafi-Nejad & John H. Dunning, The UN 
and Transnational Corporations: From Code of Conduct to Global Compact 
(2008)) (alluding to international tensions and noting the experience of the United Na-
tions Centre on Transnational Corporations with determining ways that developing coun-
tries can cooperate to ensure their own needs). 
2013] A Naturalistic Cosmopolitan Jurisprudence 63 
international law was to accord developing countries increased protec-
tion.186 
 Regardless of exactly how splits in international ideologies are de-
scribed, it is clear that this component of CLS critique has an important 
bearing on the global economic governance context, particularly with 
respect to human rights.187 Interpretations of human rights and their 
correlative duties can be construed in widely divergent ways, according 
to which of the possible legal, ethical, and cultural perspectives are 
adopted.188 The problem appears concretely in situations in which 
global firms operate in different countries such as Japan, Egypt, Viet-
nam, Brazil, Germany, and so on.189 Granted that a global company has 
a prima facie duty to provide fair conditions of employment, whose 
moral and legal standards should be used in deciding whether a given 
employment policy or practice is permissible?190 Further, members of a 
community living under a lower level of economic development will 
tend to view the right to an adequate wage differently than members of 
an affluent community, seeming to lend support to the duck-rabbit hy-
pothesis.191 
 Part of the global economic governance predicament may accord-
ingly be characterized in terms of the duck-rabbit thesis as follows. 
Whereas the domestic form of the duck-rabbit thesis deals with the 
question of which parts of legal doctrine are “core” and which are “pe-
ripheral” in legal interpretation, the international form of the thesis 
deals with the question of which soft law standards (civil regulations or 
                                                                                                                      
186 See id. 
[T]hese events produced vociferous demands by some developing countries, 
primarily in Latin America, to reshape the international economic order and, 
with it, the role and influence of FDI. In particular, the global reach of TNCs 
was perceived to be a patent symbol of lingering exploitation and depend-
ence. Developing countries urged the UN to take action to ensure that TNCs 
better met their needs. 
Id. at 1. 
187 See, e.g., Jason Morgan-Foster, A New Perspective on the Universality Debate: Reverse Moder-
ate Relativism in the Islamic Context, 10 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 35, 36 (2003) (echoing the 
CLS critique of “acceptance of the oppressor view as neutral” in the human rights context). 
188 See United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Morgan-Foster, supra note 187, at 39 (noting the vari-
ous viewpoints on formulating universal human rights jurisprudence and setting forth 
divergent theories—universalism, cultural relativism, and moderate cultural relativism). 
189 See Thomas Donaldson, Values in Tension: Ethics Away from Home, Harv. Bus. Rev., 
Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 48, 52. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
64 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:39 
human rights norms) from which country or region will prevail and be 
recognized as authoritative.192 Maintaining that developing country 
standards will prevail is a way of structuring a justifying doctrine accord-
ing to the ideological viewpoint of those countries.193 By contrast, hold-
ing that developed country standards will prevail is a way of structuring 
a justifying doctrine according to the ideological perspective of devel-
oped countries.194 
c. “Truncation” Thesis 
 The “truncation” thesis of CLS holds that “the principles that un-
derlie legal rules are not consistently applied to all of the cases over 
which they claim moral authority but are truncated well short of the 
full range of cases over which they claim authority.”195 In the global 
economic governance context, a particularly striking example of trun-
cation appears in John Ruggie’s Protect, Respect and Remedy framework 
for human rights, presented in Ruggie’s 2008 UN special report on 
human rights and transnational corporations.196 In particular, Ruggie’s 
framework establishes a truncation of human rights obligations in the 
sense that, although it assigns such obligations to states, it ultimately 
falls short of attributing all of them to corporations as well.197 
 According to Ruggie’s UN Reports and their principles, a triadic 
segmentation for the framework is established, namely: the state duty to 
protect, corporate responsibility to respect, and access to remedy.198 
i. State Duty to Protect. 
 States have a duty under international law to protect the human 
rights of individuals within their territory or jurisdiction.199 Also, inter-
national law requires states to take necessary measures to protect hu-
man rights against abuses by state and non-state actors, including busi-
ness enterprises, through appropriate policy regulation and adjudica-
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tion.200 States are also obliged to take appropriate steps to ensure that if 
human rights abuses occur within their territory or jurisdiction, the 
victims of such abuses have access to effective remedy.201 
ii. Corporate Responsibility to Respect 
 The corporate responsibility to respect human rights means that 
business enterprises should avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others, and should take adequate measures to address adverse human 
rights impacts with which they are involved.202 According to this respon-
sibility, business enterprises should respect internationally recognized 
standards of human rights in their business operations.203 Because cor-
porate responsibility to respect human rights is based on legal as well as 
moral or social responsibility grounds, a failure by a company to meet 
this responsibility may make the company subject not only to legal sanc-
tions but also to consequences in the “court[] of public opinion.”204 
 The core component of this responsibility lies in carrying out hu-
man rights due diligence, which could be part of broader corporate 
risk-management systems.205 If corporate activities go beyond the home 
state’s territory, a business entity headquartering a corporate group 
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should conduct appropriate due diligence through its supply chain 
networks, which may cover a global extension to prevent potential hu-
man rights abuses or detect a possible abuse at an early stage.206 This 
accords with social expectations.207 
iii. Access to Remedy. 
 According to Ruggie’s 2009 Report “[a]ccess to effective remedy 
. . . is an important component of both the State duty to protect and of 
the corporate responsibility to respect.”208 This means that states and 
business enterprises should establish some types of judicial or non-
judicial mechanisms for use by victims of human rights abuses.209 Ap-
propriate mechanisms include state-based judicial mechanisms, state-
based non-judicial mechanisms, such as national human rights institu-
tions (NHRIs), and national contact points (NCPs).210 Also appropriate 
are non-state, non-judicial grievance mechanisms, which may involve an 
industry-led or a company-level grievance mechanism, aimed at detect-
ing at early stages problems which otherwise could get worse and lead 
to human rights abuses.211 
 As for the content of obligation, for the state it is a duty to protect 
human rights, and for the business enterprise it is only a responsibility to 
respect human rights.212 Moreover, the obligation includes the duty or 
responsibility to take and operate appropriate remedial or grievance 
mechanisms for victims of human rights.213 The underlying norm for 
the state duty to protect is a legal norm, insofar as the state has a duty 
to protect human rights under international law.214 
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 The main sources of corporate responsibility to respect are the 
moral or social norms existing in society.215 The responsibility has a le-
gal grounding to the extent the responsibility has already been legally 
provided in the domestic laws of a state.216 Principle twenty-three of the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights states: 
“[B]usiness enterprises should . . . [c]omply with all applicable laws and 
respect internationally recognized human rights, wherever they operate 
. . .”
pment’s (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises pro-
vide
verse human rights im-
er words, they should 
extend to both states and to companies.221 
                                                                                                                     
. 217 
 This principle can be interpreted to suggest that businesses should 
respect internationally recognized human rights by complying with all 
applicable laws.218 The Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Develo
s: 
[e]nterprises should, within the framework of internationally 
recognised human rights, the international human rights ob-
ligations of the countries in which they operate as well as rele-
vant domestic laws and regulations: [] Respect human rights, 
which means they should avoid infringing on the human 
rights of others and should address ad
pacts with which they are involved.219 
The CLS truncation thesis may criticize the framework by saying that 
international human rights obligations are not consistently assigned 
across the full range of cases over which they ought to be: as universal 
moral standards serving as a constraint on the power and discretion of 
global power players to claim authority.220 In oth
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d. CLS Critique in Perspective 
 Although global economic governance is subject to “patchwork,” 
“duck-rabbit,” and “truncation” challenges, the purported indetermi-
nacy and incoherence arising from those challenges does not necessar-
ily warrant drawing the skeptical conclusion that the concepts of inter-
national rule of law and human rights are a sham.222 Anticipating sub-
sequent argument in this Article, viewing rule of law and human rights 
as regulative ideals (for example, principles demanding continuous 
vigilance to realize), rather than constitutive actualities (for instance, 
extant imperfections falling short of the ideals) overcomes the exces-
sively skeptical objections that a CLS-oriented jurisprudence would 
level against global economic governance regimes.223 
 Rather than declaring human rights schemes illegitimate across the 
board, a better view would seek a non-instrumental conception of rule 
of law and human rights in place of the instrumental conception of 
pragmatism that has produced the truncation problem in the first place. 
Further, this view would examine whether such a non-instrumental con-
ception provides a stronger basis from which to correct deficiencies in 
setting forth the human rights obligations of corporations. 
2. Law and Economics 
 In addition to CLS, the other dominant branch of legal prag-
matism is termed law and economics, or the economic analysis of 
law.224 This paradigm analyzes law through the application of economic 
methods.225 Brian Tamanaha explains that law and economics amounts 
to an instrumentalist approach to law: 
The starting assumption of economic analysis of law is “that the 
people involved with the legal system act as rational maximizers 
of their satisfaction[s].” Armed with this assumption, practi-
tioners of law and economics . . . set forth to examine the 
entire gamut of legal subjects, practices, and institutions . . . 
virtually every conceivable aspect of law. The analysis is monot-
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onously instrumental, examining in every context whether law 
is an efficient means to designated ends.226 
This model of jurisprudence presents a descriptive thesis that law 
functions mainly to maximize wealth in the sense that legal rules tend 
to promote transfers of goods and services to those parties that value 
them the most.227 Law and economics proceeds from the prescriptive 
thesis that law should be directed toward the objective of wealth 
maximization.228 
 From the standpoint of law and economics, the justification of-
fered to corporations for endorsing and implementing global govern-
ance regimes is an instrumental, functionalist characterization, cen-
tered on the concept that the purpose of the firm is to pursue profit 
maximization.229 Under this paradigm, law, and consequently legal ob-
ligation, follows the dictates of economic mandates.230 In the case of 
corporations, the economic drivers connect to the firm’s economic self-
interest.231 Nevertheless, a closer examination demonstrates that a 
pragmatic law and economics justification of profit maximization is not 
able to support the rule of law and human rights agenda against com-
peting business imperatives.232 
 Consider, as a preliminary observation, that there are dangers in 
relying on a law-and-economics-based pragmatist justification for soft law 
regimes. For one thing, NGOs are key players in the sustainability and 
human rights dialogues.233 It is of paramount importance that the moti-
vations of such stakeholders be based on secure normative foundations, 
such as the rule of law ideal and human rights. Although law and eco-
nomics pragmatic argumentation is certainly not irrelevant to descrip-
tive discussions of the emergence of soft law alongside hard law, the 
standards against which progress will be evaluated must not be limited 
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to empirical tests and hypothetical imperatives.234 Instead, it should be 
based on normative standards grounded in categorical imperatives.235 
 Further, for some NGOs, such as Amnesty International, their very 
function and mission is to advance respect for human rights.236 To be 
sure, from a public policy point of view, it is important that economic 
participants are active in developing soft law.237 The moral impetus for 
them to do so, however, is based on a common public justification tied 
to the common good and the intrinsic value of human rights—not 
simply because doing so will advance their narrow instrumental aims.238 
 Necessity also requires considering the question of corporations. 
After all, it is their conduct that must change to achieve significant pro-
gress in emerging soft law initiatives.239 Indeed their senior manage-
ment and boards of directors will need to have compelling reasons—
some plausible “business case” —for incorporating soft law initiatives 
into their operations that they can articulate to the shareholders and 
owners of the firm.240 
 Some might think that, because soft law regimes have been widely 
welcomed and endorsed by the business community, the issue of moral 
justification is beside the point.241 That is not so. There is sometimes a 
wide gulf between endorsing soft law initiatives and implementing 
them, notwithstanding the persuasive pragmatic and strategic reasons 
for corporate endorsement.242 The real test is implementation, not en-
dorsement. This in turn necessitates making difficult choices based 
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upon a variety of factors such as resource allocation, strategic planning, 
and daily management.243 Thus, the central issue is whether the justifi-
catory foundation of soft law regimes will be strong enough to hold up 
under the practical stresses and strains of corporate strategic planning 
and day-to-day operations.244 
 Undeniably, demonstrating that a course of action would enhance 
the bottom line is a strong practical justification for enlisting compli-
ance with soft law by business enterprises.245 As one scholar aptly stated, 
“[t]he question is whether such a demonstration is possible or likely to 
be seen as plausible when the costs and benefits associated with imple-
mentation are being calculated.”246 
 Returning to the discussion of Ruggie’s framework, this time we 
examine it not from the standpoint of CLS critique but instead through 
the lens of the pragmatist’s profit maximization criteria. As explained 
earlier, there is a tripartite normative architecture to Ruggie’s report.247 
First, there is the assertion that “[t]he root cause of the business and 
human rights predicament today lies in the governance gaps created by 
globalization.”248 Second is the assertion that the quintessential respon-
sibility of the state inheres in its duty to protect human rights.249 Third, 
there is the contention that business enterprises have only a responsi-
bility, but not obligations or duties, to respect human rights.250 Ruggie’s 
framework offers justification for each of these propositions.251 
 The first justificatory component, concerning “governance gaps,” 
seems to more properly refer not to a deficiency in governance in the 
sense distinguished earlier in this Article, but rather to government gaps 
in the sense of a discontinuity in the influence of law, whether domestic 
or international.252 Globalization has spawned economic activity in con-
texts where business enterprises are not, and perhaps cannot be, made 
legally accountable for both intentional and unintentional violations of 
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human rights along with their attendant harms.253 As a result of the gov-
ernance (or rather governmental) gap, a juridical vacuum is formed.254 
This vacuum becomes a breeding ground for human rights abuses and, 
hence, stands in need of closure, presumably by means of legal instru-
mentalities.255 
 The second justificatory component is the duty of governments “to 
protect against human rights abuses by non-State actors, including by 
business, affecting persons within their territory or jurisdiction.”256 This 
state obligation to provide protection is a maxim that resides “at the 
very core of the international human rights regime.”257 The justifica-
tion for that maxim as a genuine legal principle is assumed by the re-
port, which it takes to establish legal obligations or duties.258 
 The third component is the view that the core human rights re-
sponsibility of corporations is to respect human rights.259 This respon-
sibility extends into the gaps that have emerged during globalization 
that resulted in a human rights law void.260 It follows that the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights applies even in situations and 
settings where the law does not require compliance.261 
 This being the case, the proposed “responsibility to respect” can-
not be a legally grounded obligation and must be justified by reference 
to some kind of extra-legal standard.262 Seemingly, that standard is the 
social expectation referenced as “a company’s social license to oper-
ate.”263 Failure to live up to this social expectation may “subject compa-
nies to the courts of public opinion . . . and occasionally to charges in 
actual courts.”264 In other words, the failure to respect human rights 
can create risks that may impact operations and damage a company’s 
reputation, perhaps its most valuable intangible asset.265 
 All told, the justificatory foundation of Ruggie’s report is instru-
mental and pragmatic. More specifically, it relies upon the law and 
economics lodestar of economic efficiency which, in regard to the firm, 
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amounts to the objective of profit maximization.266 Yet, is this instru-
mental rationale an adequate justificatory foundation on which to 
build a corporate responsibility to respect human rights? It is clear that 
reputational and more direct financial risks associated with unethical 
conduct and human rights abuses compel some multinational corpora-
tions and industry associations to commit publicly to respecting human 
rights even where not required by law.267 Nevertheless, it is equally clear 
that profit maximization is not a compelling reason to respect human 
rights in many of the markets in which multinational and domestic 
corporations are active.268 
 In many parts of the world, respect for human rights, along the 
lines promulgated in international standard-setting documents like the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is not consistent with local cus-
tom, and is therefore not something that the public would necessarily 
even expect to emanate from business enterprises.269 Where this is the 
case, profit maximization will not necessarily lead to voluntary respect 
for human rights, where maximizing profits is understood to require 
downplaying human rights if not ignoring them altogether.270 Further, 
where respect for human rights is not a cultural expectation, any risk 
posed by the failure of corporations to respect fundamental moral 
principles implicitly embedded in a “social license to operate” will be a 
hidden risk that can only emerge down the road, if or when human 
rights values surface to shape public expectations about the standards 
that should have been respected in past transactions, but were not.271 
 In response, one may argue that even where local ethical custom 
does not support, and alternatively may resist, efforts to protect human 
rights, international public opinion and the risk of being shamed by 
international NGOs for failing to respect human rights may create risks 
that impact corporate behavior.272 Without question, international pub-
lic opinion and the actions of high-profile NGOs have had that ef-
fect.273 According to one scholar, however, international public opinion 
does not always play that role and cannot always be relied upon.274 
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From the perspective of the state, similar problems emerge.275 The 
problem of persuading governments to fulfill their legal responsibilities 
may seem less critical compared to corporations, but under conditions 
of globalization this assumption may be overly optimistic.276 As Ruggie 
noted, international law imposes a duty on states to protect human 
rights.277 Nevertheless, state governments’ adherence to international 
law is itself largely voluntary.278 
 Moreover, although some scholars maintain that states largely do 
respect their international law obligations, Ruggie’s report suggests that 
this is not always the case with respect to human rights.279 Further, Rug-
gie asserts that the pressures of globalization on state governments mili-
tate against fulfilling their duty to safeguard human rights.280 
 This analysis does not suggest, however, that Ruggie’s pragmatist-
based framework is of little value.281 As one scholar noted, “the rec-
ommendations offered would without question strengthen respect for 
human rights globally if they were widely endorsed and acted upon.”282 
The problem stems from the law and economics justificatory founda-
tions on which the report rests, which undercuts the coherence and 
practical persuasiveness of its recommendations.283 All told, there is 
little reason to believe that profit maximization provides an adequate or 
persuasive justificatory foundation on which to rest the proposed 
framework. 
C. Legal Naturalism (Normative and Non-Instrumental View of Law) 
 The positivist and pragmatist perspectives neglect to provide a 
deep justification for any moral obligation on the part of international 
agents to comply with global governance regimes.284 As this Article pre-
viously demonstrated, this is particularly problematic in regard to uni-
versal standards such as human rights.285 Legal naturalism, in contrast 
to positivism and pragmatism, rests upon the idea that there are rights 
that humans possess from their nature as rational beings, and that all 
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rational beings are entitled to be treated as ends in themselves and not 
merely as a means.286 
 This section begins by discussing an influential contemporary ver-
sion of legal naturalism: Ronald Dworkin’s model of law-as-integrity as 
set forth in his book Law’s Empire. Indeed, with respect to international 
relations, such a conception of “law’s empire” seems to anticipate the 
development of regimes of human rights and international law that 
point to an order of legitimate international and cosmopolitan law.287 
Dworkin has framed his theory as an alternative to positivism and 
pragmatism, both of which could be taken as theoretical progenitors of 
the polar opposite— “empire’s law.”288 It is “empire’s law” that imperils 
any naturalistic cosmopolitan vision with mobilizations of military, eco-
nomic, cultural, and political power, deployed under the guise of le-
gitimate coercive legal actions, yet dictated by the instrumental aims of 
power players across the globe.289 Accordingly, we shall consider to 
what extent a “law’s empire” (or law-as-integrity) approach might pro-
vide justificatory support for global economic governance regimes. Fol-
lowing that, the section turns to considering ideas from traditional 
natural law theory that establish congruence between rule of law, hu-
man rights, and global economic governance. 
1. Law’s Empire : The Law-as-Integrity Conception of Law 
 Dworkin demonstrates the incapacity of positivism and pragma-
tism to account for common law reasoning.290 Positivists, Dworkin as-
serts, attempt to singularize law from social custom with the assistance 
of a “master rule.”291 Any problems in ascertaining what the law is when 
applying it are considered questions of judicial discretion.292 According 
to positivism, legal obligation can exist only where some settled and 
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empirically verifiable rule establishes that obligation.293 In other words, 
positivists characterize law as a command system whose only constraint 
is the requirement that it maintain internal consistency.294 In Dworkin’s 
view, that position is wrong.295 The existence of some master rule con-
stitutes neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a legal sys-
tem.296 One can see it is not necessary because law can arise, as it does 
in the common law, through judicial decision-making.297 One observes 
that it is not sufficient because in applying the law, judges incorporate 
general principles that are not strictly derivable from any specific rules, 
but instead carry “gravitational force.”298 
 Such general principles of law need to be invoked especially in 
“hard cases” where judges must declare the rights and duties of the par-
ties without the benefit of any clear precedent that dictates a resolu-
tion.299 In doing so, Dworkin argues that judges are not exercising dis-
cretion in any “strong” sense; to do so would undermine the rule of law 
by, in effect, operating as a form of retroactive legislation, and also vio-
late the principle of separation of powers that reserves law creation to 
the legislative branch. Rather, they are exercising discretion in only a 
“weak” sense by selecting the best principled justification for a ruling 
that declares the pre-existing rights and duties of the parties.300 
 Pragmatists, in contrast, by treating law as a means for achieving 
instrumental goals, end up licensing interpretations of rights, not ac-
cording to independent and pre-existing legal material, but instead by 
the extra-legal and ultimately discretionary use of whatever best pro-
motes the political agenda or interests of the judge.301 Yet, that contra-
dicts the idea that rights are essentially counter-utilitarian; that is, rights 
serve as “trumps” against collective goals.302 
 Regarding the concept of law, Dworkin understands law as the 
scheme of rights and responsibilities that licenses either the deploy-
ment or withholding of collective force, where such force is construed 
as governmental coercion on behalf of a single nation-state.303 Examin-
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ing this concept—which is narrowly tailored to fit a domestic legal or-
der such as that of the United States especially—with reference to the 
wider context of soft law yields some interesting observations.304 
Dworkin did not intend to propose a theory for international law, 
much less for soft law.305 Nevertheless, the strong normative features of 
his theory provide at least a starting point for a cosmopolitan jurispru-
dence grounded in rule of law and human rights.306 With this in mind, 
one may single out the single-state-centered aspects of Dworkin’s the-
ory which, while intended to justify domestic state law, prove insuffi-
cient for a cosmopolitan jurisprudence inclusive of soft law.307 Thus, 
Dworkin’s formulation of the concept of law: (i) binds the concept of 
law to the separate concept of coercion, in particular state coercion; 
and (ii) overly restricts that concept to the rights and responsibilities of 
single-nation communities.308 
 Many authoritative interpretations of soft law initiatives do not di-
rectly involve the legitimation or constraint of state coercion, because 
their addressees include other actors such as corporations, IGOs, and 
NGOs.309 Accordingly, Dworkin’s canonical expression of the concept 
of law is too narrow to capture what is “law-like” in global governance 
regimes of civil regulations.310 The initiatives are indeed law-like in that 
they are formulated as written norms, using legal forms of ordering 
such as contract, legislation, managerial direction, dialogue, and vot-
ing; they are intended as laying down policies, principles and standards; 
further, they are “enforced” with informal reputational “sanctions,” and 
they serve to deploy and also restrain power and influence.311 
 I suggest a modified formulation of the concept of law as the prin-
cipled justification establishing the legitimacy of authoritative conduct: 
policymaking, decision-making, and action (or forbearance) on behalf 
of global economic and political actors. In an abstract sense, law con-
sists of justifying theories of standards for authoritative conduct, which 
may or may not ever be manifested as deployments of political force or 
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coercion as such.312 Even in the context of domestic and international 
“hard” law, legal norms are constituted, interpreted, applied in particu-
lar cases, and obeyed on a regular basis without employing coercive 
mechanisms, such as sanctions (e.g., fines, incarcerations, payment of 
damages).313 The logical connection between coercive force and law is 
a contingent, not a necessary one.314 
 This account of the concept of law better explains why the effec-
tive institution of and regular compliance with legal norms need not 
involve essential reference to official state sanctions or governmental 
force at all.315 Moreover, the revised account lends greater cogency 
both to the notion of soft law as a primary form or exemplar of law and 
to non-positivistic, non-instrumental conceptions of law, such as those 
advanced in the natural law tradition.316 
 The spirit of this account is analogous to, yet the inverse of, what 
Kelsen had in mind by his “pure” theory of law. Kelsen sought to pro-
vide an empirical account of the nature of law, which he took to be a 
system of coercive norms, apart from what he saw as a separate and 
non-empirical phenomenon of a philosophy of justice.317 Yet, precisely 
the opposite is the case. A philosophy of justice, or a theory of rights, is 
integral, not accessory, to law and rule of law.318 After all, it is the de-
mand of justice that arbitrary power be properly restrained, and that 
legal authority be legitimate. Further, whereas coercion is no doubt a 
prominent and highly visible means of ensuring compliance with justi-
fied legal norms, it is in no way either the exclusive or the necessary 
method that law provides for preserving and expanding its reach either 
within a national community, between national communities, or on 
behalf of the world community.319 
 It is instructive to examine the following discussion of the concept 
of law Dworkin posits: 
Governments have goals: they aim to make the nations they 
govern prosperous or powerful or religious or eminent; they 
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also aim to remain in power. They use the collective force they 
monopolize to these and other ends. Our discussions about 
law by and large assume, I suggest, that the most abstract and 
fundamental point of legal practice is to guide and constrain 
the power of government in the following way. Law insists that 
force not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that 
would be to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or noble 
these ends, except as licensed or required by individual rights 
and responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about 
when collective force is justified. 
 The law of a community on this account is the scheme of 
rights and responsibilities that meet that complex standard: 
they license coercion because they flow from past decisions of 
the right sort. They are therefore “legal” rights and responsi-
bilities.320 
As illuminating as this formulation may be for capturing essential fea-
tures of domestic law, such an account—which explicitly identifies law 
with rights and responsibilities that “license coercion” —is misleading 
and under-inclusive regarding global soft law civil regulations.321 It is 
misleading because it suggests that law is concerned only with state 
power having specific manifestation as coercion.322 In fact, much interna-
tional political power is wielded, not as outright coercion, but also as 
“soft power” in Joseph Nye’s sense.323 It is under-inclusive because it 
effectively leaves out not only international soft law but also hard law, 
neither of which are established by a single domestic community but 
rather by a multiplicity of overlapping communities.324 
 Law concerns the ordering and legitimation by rule of law of many 
variant social, moral, and economic relations in a community, not just 
deployments (and suppressions) of political force qua coercion.325 
Dworkin’s conception of law lays stress on the interpretive dimension of 
law.326 Throughout Law’s Empire, the nature of legal interpretation is 
represented as a “constructive” undertaking similar to literary and artis-
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tic interpretation.327 One may ask why Dworkin includes the coercion 
element in the concept of law at all. At least part of the reason is con-
cern for a kind of “intellectual stare decisis” —an effort to follow the 
tendency of modern theories of jurisprudence to stress the connection 
between law and force.328 After all, the liberal ideal of rule of law in-
volves the notion that law is a constraint on the exercise of political 
power.329 While the rule of law may embody control on the exercise of 
power as an important function of law (it has been historically signifi-
cant, especially since the Old Regime), it is not obviously true that this 
is either the defining or the most salient characteristic of law itself.330 
 Of course, Dworkin’s formulation of the concept of law departs 
from positivist conceptions in many important respects.331 For instance, 
Dworkin’s understanding of legal obligation as a genre of associative 
obligations, and his statement of the “rights thesis” originally set out in 
Taking Rights Seriously is at odds with Austin’s “command thesis,” Hart’s 
“internal point of view” hypothesis, and Kelsen’s “coercive system of 
norms” account.332 
  In support of Dworkin’s effort, it may be said that this is what we 
want from a concept of law: an “umbrella” idea that allows important 
theories of law to share at least something in common, in this case, the 
law-as-legitimate-coercion notion.333 That might be a worthy aim, but 
unfortunately to come under the positivist’s conceptual tent is to per-
petuate the mistake of placing the concept of law on the same plateau 
as the concept of a national legal system, with reference only to the 
centralized command mechanisms of the same.334 It may be—although 
doubtful—that the concept of a legal system ought to include coercion 
as an essential element.335 The fact that most, though not all, legal 
norms are in principle capable of being backed up by the deployment 
of state force (for example, garnishment procedures or imprisonment), 
or that some norms require that the state not exercise its force in spe-
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cific areas (for instance, the establishment clause or constraints on pri-
vacy invasion), tends to underscore the gravity of the authoritative deci-
sion-making process.336 Citizens do often have a lot at stake in legal 
outcomes. But the measure of practical importance of official state 
conduct manifested as coercive force is ancillary to the deeper question 
of legitimacy.337 Moreover, in the context of global economic govern-
ance, not all material authoritative conduct standing in need of justifi-
cation and restraint is expressed, or even expressible, as coercive 
force.338 
 One may argue that Dworkin’s formulation could be immunized 
from this critique if we stipulate that whatever a government does pur-
suant to law, whether it be policymaking, decision-making, or symbolic 
display, et cetera, is by definition either an exercise or withholding of the 
sort of “collective force” to which he alludes in the above excerpt.339 
The problem with this line of thought is that the “force” of law (scheme 
of rights and responsibilities) behind governmental conduct is much 
broader than the “license for coercion” that Dworkin depicts.340 
 The force of law is ultimately authoritative force, yet it is highly 
nuanced.341 It encompasses not only brute and physical forms of coer-
cion (physical and economic sanction), but also complex forms of 
moral and psychological sanctions, as well as positive incentives and 
rewards.342 Law is often as effective through persuasive, symbolic, and 
recommendatory modes as through coercive modes, though admittedly 
the former tend to attract less publicity than the latter.343 It should also 
be noted that forms of coercion operable in legal contexts (whether 
domestic or international, and whether soft or hard) are themselves 
often instrumentalities, not ends in themselves aimed at attracting vol-
untary peaceable compliance with norms and at promoting an attitude 
of respect for legitimate authority.344 
 Another possible explanation for Dworkin’s inclusion of the power 
element in the concept of law relates to the parochial nature of this 
theoretical focus. Dworkin’s theory of law is at heart a theory of U.S. 
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and British law.345 Yet, it is not clear why the law of those two coun-
tries—or for that matter national law in general—ought to be consid-
ered paradigmatic of the concept of law.346 This point is especially vital 
given the displacement of the state alongside of other actors in global 
governance syndicates.347 
 Because soft law and hard international law are law too,348 they 
ought to come within the purview of an abstract portrayal of the con-
cept of law.349 Nonetheless, these two important varieties of law fall 
largely outside the scope of Dworkin’s formulation due to the narrow 
“license for coercion” wording he employs.350 
 The idea of law as a form of formal coercion implies that enforce-
ment mechanisms are a key ingredient in any recipe for legal stan-
dards.351 Yet, the comparatively less enforceable (and less enforced) 
character of international norms does not diminish their legal status.352 
Legal positivists such as Austin, Hart, and Kelsen misleadingly portray 
domestic legal systems as paradigmatic of the concept of law.353 The 
result is that such theories tend to take exaggerated stances on the legal 
status of international law, including global civil regulations and human 
rights standards.354 
 A survey of the various types of voluntary civil regulations in global 
economic governance regimes reveals that they do not involve any es-
sential connection to coercion or enforcement.355 Yet ultimately, en-
forcement is problematic even for domestic law.356 For instance, it is 
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hard to see how a judgment for a private citizen against the U.S. gov-
ernment under the Federal Tort Claims Act could be enforced if the 
government opted not to comply with the court order.357 Moreover, a 
good deal of what we normally call law concerns the nonviolent back-
ground facilitation of private arrangements such as commercial invest-
ments, contracts, powers of attorney, wills, negotiable instruments, and 
the like.358 These sorts of legal arrangements are governed by rules and 
principles complied with because they are either seen to impose genu-
ine obligations or to produce mutually beneficial outcomes for affected 
parties, not out of a sense of being coerced by power-wielding offi-
cials.359 
 Another objection might doubt that my references to international 
law are fair, since Dworkin’s focus is exclusively on American and Brit-
ish law. Accordingly, one might think that such domestic legal systems 
provide the most apt paradigms for the concept of law. The concept of 
international law, the argument would go, is but a weak facsimile of the 
concept of domestic law. But that would be a bad argument because it 
assumes a primacy for national law with no supporting rationale. The 
question of which is more basic—national or international law— re-
flects a deep interpretive issue. 
 Kelsen expressed this conceptual problem through a distinction 
between “pluralistic” and “monistic” construals of international law.360 
The former view holds that international law and national law are dis-
tinct and mutually independent orders regulating different subject 
matters and having separate sources (basic norms).361 The latter view, 
however, deems the international legal order as itself authorizing vari-
ous spheres of validity of national orders—and by extension, we might 
add, soft law civil regulation regimes as well.362 For Kelsen, one em-
braces the monistic hypothesis (as a “free” matter of values and atti-
tudes) if one intends to interpret international social, economic, and 
political relations as genuine legal relations.363 
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2. Summary of Points 
 We may summarize a number of points in light of the application 
of jurisprudential paradigms to the global economic governance con-
text: 
• Positivism misconstrues the nature of international soft law norms 
(civil regulations and human rights) as an exclusively factual mat-
ter, which runs afoul of the is-ought distinction.364 Descriptive “is’s” 
which are constitutive of facts, do not amount to the same thing as 
prescriptive “oughts,” which are constitutive of values and moral 
judgments.365 
• Pragmatism (instrumental theories such as law and economics, le-
gal realism, and CLS) misconstrues soft law norms as fictions (“as 
if” assertions) constructed to serve ideological, political, and eco-
nomic objectives, not as non-instrumental standards (for example, 
trumps over a community’s goals that are legitimated on grounds 
of principle).366 
• As a naturalistic account, the law-as-integrity approach carries the 
advantage of presenting a non-instrumental normative theory of 
law that avoids the descriptive and instrumental deficiencies of 
positivism and pragmatism.367 Accordingly, it moves closer in the 
direction of assimilating legal reasoning to moral reasoning than 
positivist and pragmatist models, providing an alternative to the 
discretionism that otherwise threatens to undermine the rule of 
law.368 
• Nevertheless, law-as-integrity has the following deficiencies that in-
hibit its serviceability as a jurisprudential model for global govern-
ance: (1) the theory restricts its non-instrumental conception of 
law to the domestic sphere,369 failing to provide any support for a 
conception of an idealized “associative” international community; 
(2) the theory ties the concept of law to state coercion, but global 
governance is characterized by a diminution of state authority and 
by motivations for compliance that are non-coercive in nature;370 
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(3) the theory, while asserting a rigorous conception of contractu-
arian-based civil rights of the sort enjoyed by members of advanced 
democratic political communities, fails to offer an account of uni-
versal natural human rights that would reflect the normative status 
of a global citizenry;371 (4) the theory gives no account of the in-
terplay between law-obedience and virtue, which is vital given the 
need for internal motivation to follow soft law, and given the fact 
that reputation-based judgments (informal “sanctions” constitut-
ing the “rule of reputation” and sense of legitimacy) presuppose 
virtue and character (or the lack thereof) on the part of economic 
participants.372 
3. Natural Law Theory 
 Natural law theory, in contrast to positivism and pragmatism, sees 
law as essentially connected to human nature, and therefore as 
universal.373 According to natural law theory, morality is in turn tied to 
our human nature as rational beings.374 Thus, since reason can 
discover valid moral principles by examining the nature of humanity in 
society, the content of human-made positive law cannot gain legitimacy 
except by way of some reference to natural law.375 Seen in this way, 
natural law provides a deeper standpoint from which to criticize law 
itself. 
D
case may be).376 What difference does it make whether there is some 
                                                       
a. eeper Foundation for Human Rights 
 One might agree that human rights standards exist as written 
norms, containing expressions of international policy, and yet wonder 
why we cannot—as positivists and pragmatists would be inclined to 
do—simply speak of governments, institutions and corporations re-
specting, promoting, and protecting them (or violating them as the 
                                                               
a text accompanying notes 303–311. 
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at can be made in international relations. Even abusers of human rights feel 
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375 See id. 
376 See Ken Booth, Three Tyrannies, in Human Rights in Global Politics 31, 58–59 
(Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler eds., 1999) (“All states regularly proclaim their accep-
tance of and adherence to international human rights norms—notably the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights—and charges of human rights violations are among the 
strongest th
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more fundamental moral law behind the posited written rules and the 
policies they embody? What needs to be shown is not simply that busi-
ness enterprises, states, and the people belonging to them should re-
spect human rights and other institutionally sponsored global impera-
tives as a matter of custom or habit, or to meet social expectations, or to 
avoid sanctions, or to fulfill some function. Rather, they all must be 
shown to stand under a more fundamental law—what Kant and others 
term “the moral law” —that gives normative legitimacy to, and also con-
strains the discretion of global actors in observance of, the rule of law 
for global economic governance.377 
 We can understand the rule of law that underwrites global eco-
nomic governance not as a fixed repository of knowledge we possess of 
the normative features of our world, but rather as a means for giving 
answers to legal and moral questions that are embedded within global 
governance initiatives.378 Otherwise stated, there are moral facts and 
truths that exist separate from procedures, which the procedures are 
oriented to pursue.379 
 This amounts to something like the process Aristotle calls dialectic 
and John Rawls terms “reflective equilibrium.”380 One begins with set-
tled views, intending to find principles harmonious with most of 
them.381 Then one moves on to give some explanation for those views 
or to correct them should they prove deficient.382 Throughout the dia-
lectical process, one will set forth value assertions that express views 
about what the good life is.383 
 Moral skeptics who would deny the existence or possibility of legal-
ity, much less legitimacy, in global economic governance characteristi-
cally claim that there can be no pathway guiding us toward genuine 
                                                                                                                      
the need to defend themselves in the currency of the human rights discourse; they do not 
reject it.”). 
377 See Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity 29, 99 (1996) (“The 
very notion of a legitimate authority is already a normative one and cannot be used to 
ans rmative question.”). 
M. Hartman, Socratic Questions and Aristotelian Answers: A Virtue-Based Approach 
to B ics, 78 J. Bus. Ethics 313, 320–21 (2008) (examining the dialectical process 
and  to Rawls’s notion of reflective equilibrium). 
wer the no
378 See id. at 35 (distinguishing between substantive moral realism and procedural moral 
realism). 
379 See id. 
380 Edwin 
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381 See id. 
382 See id. 
383 See id. 
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moral truth.384 Under such a view, it does not matter what we do or fail 
to do. This is nihilism: the belief that words like “ought,” “must,” and 
“should” express conceptual error.385 We shall test the cogency of this 
position in a moment. For now, let us turn to the idea of a higher law 
illuminating the rule of law and human rights, and the role this regula-
tive ideal might assume in a naturalist jurisprudential paradigm for 
global economic governance. 
. Le
     
b gitimacy from Higher Moral Law 
 The concept of a law higher than written norms has been recog-
nized from ancient times.386 Central to the conception of such a higher 
law is the idea that human dignity surpasses any particular social order 
as the foundation for moral rights, and can neither be bestowed nor 
legitimately infringed by society.387 As such, human dignity forms the 
conceptual core of human rights, and embraces the intrinsic worth in-
herent in all human beings.388 Within the natural law tradition, and in 
Catholic social thought, the wellspring of human dignity is the concept 
                                                                                                                 
384 See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms 250–51 (2006) (argu-
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to bury her rebel brother Polyneices, slain in civil war, against Creon’s ban on burials 
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Rudall & Bernard Sahlins eds., Nicholas Rudall trans., Ivan R. Dee 1998) (441 B.C.E.). 
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55). 
387 See William Ebenstein & Alan Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers: Plato to 
the Present 144 (2000). A concern for universal human dignity at the heart of the moral 
law is present in Stoic philos
 the Roman Empire. Id. Within the rich heritage of Roman jurisprudence that later 
emerged, Cicero expressed a concept of unwritten moral l
re will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the 
future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times.” Id. 
at 138 (quoting Cicero, De Re Publica 211 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., Harvard Univ. 
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o ago Dei, which regards the human person as having been made in 
the image and likeness of God.
f im
natural rights discernible by all rational beings, taken 
                                                                                                                     
389 
 The notion of an unseen higher law rests at the core of modern 
treatments of rights.390 For John Locke, even in a state of nature there 
is a law, embedded in reason, recognized by all people.391 Such a law of 
nature engenders 
 
389 See Catechism of the Catholic Church 91–96; Pope John Paul II, Encyclical 
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aetate_en.html; Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Pastoral Cons
rch in the Modern World: Gaudium et Spes ¶¶ 12–24 (1965) [hereinafter Gaudium 
et Spes], available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/docu- 
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 Recourse to the idea of higher moral law has been central to many civil rights 
ghout United States history. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States
41, 257 (1964) (“In framing Title II of [the Civil Rights] Act Congress was . . . deal-
th what it considered a moral problem.”). Martin Luther King, Jr.’s famous Letter
gham Jail decried the persistence of
A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of 
God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put 
it in th
rooted in eternal and natural law. 
n Luther King Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail, in I Have a Dream: Writin
hes That Changed the World 83, 89 ( James M. Washington ed., 1992). Accor
inas: 
Human law is law inasmuch as it is in conformity with righ
derives from the eternal law. But when a law is contrary to reason, it is called 
an unjust law; but in this case it ceases to be a law and becomes instead an act 
f violenceo  . . . . Every law made by man can be called a law insofar as it de-
rives from the natural law. But if it is somehow opposed to the natural law, 
then it is really not a law but rather a corruption of the law. 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 284 (Timothy McDermott ed., Christian Classics 
1989) (c. 1265). 
391 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 123 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner 
Press 1947) (1
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to  independent of, and prior to, rights instituted by specific political 
arrangements.
 be
on its 
wn
es 
392 
 The belief in a higher law for human societies has not been re-
stricted to Western civilization.393 Not only was such a concept found in 
ancient China, it was of greater significance than the comparatively 
weak Chinese counterparts to Western positive law.394 Arguments sup-
porting the existence of such a law—which encompasses a broad scope 
of human conduct—appear in canonical philosophical writings from 
China extending back to the fifth century BC.395 Confucian thought 
held that economic, social, and political order was attainable only if 
people conformed themselves to the ways of Heaven.396 This invisible 
order could be known by introspection, meditation, and the investiga-
tion of things.397 Mencius, one of Confucius’s disciples, articulated vari-
ous kinds of protocols that would enable an economy to flourish “
o ” in the manner of self-actualization, which is accomplished not by 
positive means but instead by way of inaction, known as wuwei.398 
 Within the sphere of international law, the notion of an unwritten 
law has been vital. For instance, during the Nazi war crimes trials at 
Nuremberg, jurisdictional limitations precluded prosecuting the crim
pursuant to the laws of the various participating nation-states.399 Ac-
cordingly, the indictments referenced “crimes against humanity.”400 
 One of the most sophisticated proponents of natural law thinking, 
Thomas Aquinas posited that natural law is that part of the eternal law 
of the creator that is presented to human reason.401 Natural law guides 
our reason through a rational trepidation of the eternal law that mani-
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398 Id. Other ancient Chinese thinkers, among them Shang Yang (390–338 B.C.E.), who 
earned the label “legalists,” emphasized keeping the kingdom strong by disciplining the peo-
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 Shang (died 338 BC), http://www.philosophy.hku.hk
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399 See Kramer & Kauzlarich, supra note 3
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fests itself as precepts, rules of behavior, or broad principles of natural 
law.402 Humans must choose to observe the law of nature through their 
own free will because we are autonomous beings.403 Because natural 
reason, human laws are positive laws that 
re, 
uinas termed determinatio.409 To 
lust
     
law is a product of unaided 
a or should be, derived from natural law.404 
c. Derivation and Discernment 
 In the tradition of Aquinas, natural law theorists maintain that just 
positive law is “derived” from natural law.405 There are, however, two 
distinct kinds of derivation. “In certain cases, [law] . . . “directly forbids 
or requires what morality itself forbids or requires.”406 The way in which 
the positive law derives from the natural law is analogous to the way 
conclusions are deduced from premises in the natural sciences or 
mathematics.407 Nevertheless, this deductive approach is not possible 
for other types of positive law.408 Instead, these positive laws invoke the 
exercise of the practical intellect that Aq
il rate this idea, Aquinas invokes an analogy examining the activity of 
an architect, whose design choices are made to satisfy a patron’s needs 
and tastes within practical extremes.410 
 Like the architect, global economic governance participants main-
tain similar creative freedom in working from basic practical principles, 
directing actions toward the advancement and protection of human 
rights.411 In doing so, these participants also work to prevent disregard 
for human rights, and toward concrete schemes of regulation aimed at 
coordinating conduct to promote the well-being of various economic 
communities impacted by firms’ activities.412 The fairness of the distri-
bution of burdens and benefits attending a scheme of regulation is a 
key consideration for assigning corporate responsibility for human 
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rights.413 Yet, the interests and well-being of each individual person or 
stakeholder must be taken into account and no single interest may be 
unfairly or unreasonably favored or disfavored, because on the legal 
atu
 to traditional sources of external motivations 
an
of a supernatural end to Aristotle’s naturalistic conception, according to 
which one attains virtue and eudaimonia through the fulfillment of one’s 
nat es not em-
     
n ralist account, all persons have an inherent equal dignity.414 The 
common good, however, is not the utilitarian definition of the best in-
terests of the greatest number; rather, it is the shared good of all.415 
 In his thought, Aquinas also demonstrates concern for a dynamic 
that, although neglected by legal positivist and legal pragmatist ap-
proaches, is of great significance for understanding the legitimacy of 
global governance: the complex interplay between law and virtue.416 
This is an especially important consideration for global governance be-
cause we cannot look
(s ctions). Instead, there is a pronounced need for some account of 
the intrinsic motivation to follow soft law.417 Virtue ethics is the logical 
place to look for that. 
 Aquinas expounded and further developed Aristotle’s virtue eth-
ics.418 Both thinkers held that human well-being is necessarily related to 
a person’s purpose or end.419 Aquinas, however, contributed the notion 
ural capacities.420 For Aquinas, human nature alone do
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) (providing empirical support for impact of employees’ willingness to unde
vironmental conduct). 
 See Ebenstein & Ebenstein, supra note 387, at 224. 
 See id. 
 See id.; Aristotle’s Ethics, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (Mar. 29, 2010), http://p
rd.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/ (defining “eudaimonia” as “happin
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body its own aspirations.421 Accordingly, Aquinas was concerned with 
both a person’s natural end and his supernatural end, rendering Aristo-
telian ethics incomplete in his conception.422 Thus, Aquinas held that 
human perfection is necessarily the work of two societies—one con-
cerned with temporal good and the other with transcendent good.423 
 Recognizing the limits of positive law in producing virtuous peo-
ple—and for the contemporary global context, this theory applies to 
virtuous companies as well—Aquinas taught that law should not di-
rectly mandate the exercise of all the virtues, nor directly prohibit the 
exercise of every vice.424 True virtue entails exercising reason and free 
will to make the right choices.425 The central practical challenge of an 
individual’s moral life is to decide what to do in the inimitable circum-
stances in which each distinct person finds himself.426 
d. Human Well-Being and Economic Governance 
 The normative principles connected to fundamental aspects of 
human well-being guide our practical reason; they inform our moral 
deliberation about how we should act.427 Logically speaking, such 
foundational principles of practical reflection entail norms that lead us 
to pursue some options, while requiring that we abandon others. How 
does this approach apply in the global economic governance context of 
rendering business decisions that involve a competition between self-
                                                                                                                      
If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should 
be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing 
in us. Whether it be reason or something else that is this element which is 
thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things no-
already said. 
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interested conduct (profit maximization) and conduct consistent with 
human rights and other standards aimed at the common good? 
 In its broader sense, “corporate governance” concerns decisions 
made by a firm’s executives, along with the impact that these decisions 
have on an array of stakeholders.428 Accordingly, considering the con-
temporary context of global economic governance and taking corpo-
rate governance in this wider sense, one must include principles that 
uld respect rights people have by virtue of 
 humanity, not vice versa; meeting the needs 
                                                                                                                     
steer economic decision-making toward human well-being and those 
that demand respect for rights people possess simply by virtue of their 
429humanity (human rights).  Let us specify a set of these highly general 
principles for business enterprises within the context of global eco-
nomic governance: 
• Business enterprises should choose and act in ways compatible 
with a will toward integral human fulfillment.430 
• Business enterprises sho
their humanity—human rights.431 
• The various economic systems at all levels—national, regional, and 
global—exist to serve
and wants of the human body and spirit is the ultimate purpose of 
an economic system.432 
• Justice, virtue and human rights are necessary to check abuses that 
derive from excessive gain-seeking behavior and other unbalanced 
business tendencies. 
 Drawing upon a conception of a higher moral law provides a 
means of calling attention to objective principles of right action for 
business.433 The above list of principles begins with what is, from a logi-
cal standpoint, the initial as well as the most abstract moral precept. 
 
428 By contrast, the narrower sense of “corporate governance” is limited to actions of a 
firm’s board of directors, addressing specifically the relationship between a firm and its 
boa
phical Reflections 
on t
 et al., Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends, 32 Am. J. 
Juri
 Public Sector Organisations 11, 11–12 
(To
mic_justice_for_all.pdf (“The economy should serve people, 
not 
rd. 
429 See James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights: Philoso
he Universal Declaration of Human Rights 147–70 (1987). 
430 See Germain Grisez
s. 99, 131–33 (1987). 
431 See Tom Campbell, Moral Dimensions of Human Rights, in Human Rights and the 
Moral Responsibilities of Corporate and
m Campbell & Seumas Miller eds., 2004). 
432 See U.S. Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on 
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, at viii (1997), available at http:// 
www.usccb.org/upload/econo
the other way around.”). 
433 See Jackson, supra note 393, at 275–83. 
94 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:39 
This precept asserts that one ought to choose and act in harmony with 
a will aimed at overall human fulfillment.434 This is followed by a prin-
 our shared humanity.439 Of 
art
                                                                                                                     
ciple concerning respect for human rights, which—as a corrective to 
the pragmatist truncation imposed by John Ruggie’s framework—
counts businesses as shouldering genuine moral obligations correlative 
to those rights alongside individuals, NGOs, governments, and any 
other organizations that can be counted as moral actors.435 
 Some would argue that using human rights language in specifying 
global economic governance initiatives is unnecessary.436 But while it 
may not be absolutely necessary to employ the vocabulary of rights, it 
seems altogether reasonable and indeed efficacious to do so. We prop-
erly speak of an employee’s right not to be discriminated against by her 
company on the basis of her gender.437 We can accurately describe a 
garment subcontractor’s trafficking in human slavery as a violation of 
human rights.438 Such moral imperatives are significant human rights 
that people possess. From whatever communities they are drawn, all 
individuals are bound to respect these rights, not because of their 
membership in any particular “visible” domestic or even international 
legal order (albeit the latter is comparatively less enforceable and less 
clearly articulated), but rather by virtue of
p icular importance regarding this shared human status is our nature 
as rational beings.440 As Aristotle and other thinkers have endeavored 
to show, rationality is the nature of human beings.441 Therefore, it is 
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with regard to our distinctive human nature that we are endowed with a 
profound, robust, and inherent dignity.442 
 So in a fundamental way, basic moral rights are rights predicated 
on humans. Also, there exist along with negative duties and their cor-
relative rights, various positive duties for business enterprises, individu-
als, governments, NGOs, and so forth.443 Such corresponding moral 
duties may also be specified and assigned with a vocabulary of rights. In 
m a 
rta
more than just instrumental justifications for acting. Are there intrinsic, 
                                                                                                                     
this regard, however, it is necessary to pay special heed, as George 
Brenkert,444 Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee,445 Henry 
Shue,446 James Nickel,447 Wesley Cragg,448 Tom Campbell,449 and many 
others have, to questions concerning precisely by whom and exactly 
how any given human right is to be honored. 
 The conception of human rights advanced here follows fro
ce in conception of human dignity.450 According to this view, our 
natural capacities for reason and the existential freedom that we pos-
sess are fundamental to our dignity as human beings.451 Human rights 
serve to safeguard and to further advance that dignity. The basic goods 
of our human nature are the goods that a rational creature enjoys. 
 We may question whether human beings are really as rational as 
this account supposes them to be.452 It is readily apparent that some 
ends or purposes are intelligible in the sense that they afford a means 
to other ends. For example, in working to earn money our conduct is 
rational. After all, money is a valuable means to numerous important 
ends. No one doubts its instrumental value. Thus, even moral skeptics 
cannot deny that there are instrumental goods. The question then be-
comes whether some ends or purposes are intelligible as supplying 
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as well as instrumental, goods? Moral skeptics deny that there are intel-
ligible ends or purposes that make possible rationally motivated behav-
ior.453 Their opponents assert that aesthetic appreciation, friendship, 
knowledge, and virtue, along with other purposes or ends carry intrin-
sic value; they are ends in themselves.454 Therefore, we cannot reduce 
them by accounting for their worth solely in terms of non-rational mo-
tivational elements like desire and emotions. As basic human goods, 
ey
’s portrayal of our thoughts as “Scouts and Spies” of our de-
                                                                                                                     
th  are part-and-parcel of the well-being and fulfillment of both indi-
viduals and human communities.455 Consequently these goods serve as 
a basis for moral judgment, including our normative interpretations 
concerning justice and human rights.456 
 Underlying this way of thinking is a realist epistemology.457 We ac-
quire genuine knowledge of the essence of humankind. Even given ob-
vious variations manifested in different cultures, in different historical 
contexts, and in different traits, enough similarity exists among humans 
to reveal an enduring and universal human nature.458 Nevertheless, it 
must be granted that some subscribe to worldviews that provide a differ-
ent account of the human capacities that this Article alleges form a 
ground for human dignity.459 Such philosophies give an instrumental 
and non-cognitivist account of practical reason, and maintain that our 
experience of deliberation, judgment, and choice is an illusion.460 David 
Hume’s contention that reason is subservient to the passions and Tho-
mas Hobbes
sires are the loci classici.461 If the advocates of these non-cognitivist and 
subjectivist views of human action are correct, then any project of busi-
ness ethics would be doomed, and the notion of human dignity would 
be illusory. 
 Nevertheless, ethical non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism actu-
ally depend upon the very standards of rationality that they seek to at-
 
n Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 73–75 (2d ed. 2011). 
e id. 
 L. 655, 679–80 (2008). 
 Leviathan 139 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin 
Boo
453 See Joh
454 See id. 81–89. 
455 Se
456 See id. 
457 See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Law and the Moral Life, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. 383, 384–85 
(1999). 
458 See id. at 385. 
459 See Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights, 19 Eur. J. Int’l
460 See Ebenstein & Ebenstein, supra note 387, at 426. 
461 See id. at 426; Thomas Hobbes,
ks 1987) (1651). 
2013] A Naturalistic Cosmopolitan Jurisprudence 97 
tack in constructing their arguments.462 Certainly, emotion does figure 
into human action, and sometimes it or other non-rational elements 
are key motivators.463 Nevertheless, people can and do properly appeal 
 re
ertainly 
clu
n provide a backdrop for the human rights 
                                                                                                                     
to asons for action. As Aristotle demonstrated, these reasons relate to 
ends that are taken to be aimed at human fulfillment.464 Moreover, our 
pursuits of such ends are desired as just that. Stated otherwise, our ra-
tional ends have an essential role to play in our motivations.465 
 If all this is true, how do we account for widespread neglect of hu-
man rights and other moral principles? One reason is that while we are 
rational creatures, our rationality is far from perfect.466 We remain vul-
nerable to error in moral judgment.467 Another reason, as Kenneth 
Goodpaster demonstrates, is that many people in both politics and 
business are prone to “teleopathy,” a character habit that “values certain 
limited objectives as supremely action-guiding, to the relative exclusion 
not only of larger ends, but also of moral considerations about means, 
obligations, and duties.”468 To Goodpaster, teleopathy is an unbalanced 
pursuit of purpose, either directly in decision-making or indirectly in 
loyalty to some function or role.469 This fixation on purpose, Goodpas-
ter argues, leads to rationalization, which in turn leads to moral de-
tachment.470 The result can be unethical conduct which would c
in de neglect for human rights. Consider, as an example, the pursuit 
of the “war on terror” of the Bush administration that led to disregard 
for even international legal standards of the Geneva Convention prohib-
iting torture of terrorist suspects detained at Guantanamo Bay.471 
 If there is a set of moral norms, including norms of justice and 
human rights that can be known by rational inquiry, understanding, 
and judgment, even apart from divine revelation, then these norms of 
unwritten moral law ca
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par  of 
sti
esis” 
w-as-integrity frame of reference, 
such by the actors themselves.479 Moreover, there is not much effort in 
                                                                                                                     
adigm of global economic governance.472 Indeed, “[a]s a matter
ju ce, governments and corporations alike are bound to respect and, 
to the extent possible (affordable), be proactive in protecting and ad-
vancing such rights.”473 
III. Legal Naturalism in the Global Governance Context 
 Seen from the perspectives of both positivist and pragmatist 
frameworks of jurisprudence, one would approach the task of render-
ing an account of soft law (global economic governance) by invoking 
what have respectively come to be known as “The Separation Th
and “The Social Thesis.”474 The separation thesis holds that “there is a 
conceptual separation between law and morality, that is, between what 
the law is, and what the law ought to be.”475 The social thesis “asserts 
that law is, profoundly, a social phenomenon, and that the conditions 
of legal validity consist of social—that is, non-normative—facts.”476 
 If viewed from a Dworkinian la
these two theses would be rejected, and adopted in their place would 
be the thesis that law and morality are necessarily connected.477 Never-
theless, the paradigm developed by Dworkin on its face limits inquiry to 
domestic regimes, fuses the concept of law to state coercion, and pro-
vides no account of human rights.478 
 In the context of shifting views of the role of economic partici-
pants in global governance regimes, scholarly treatment and analysis of 
various soft law initiatives may impact public policy as well as both the 
strategic and the day-to-day management of corporations doing busi-
ness in global markets. Yet, positivist and pragmatist paradigms, by of-
fering only empirical and instrumental analysis of global governance 
regimes, fail to justify these regimes by suggesting or arguing that the 
responsibility of global actors to respect the rule of law and human 
rights is an ethical or moral responsibility, and should be recognized as 
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the initiatives themselves to explain or justify this aspect of the soft law 
initiatives.480 This omission is important because the failure to ground 
to a hasty dis-
iss
nd im-
e variety of ethical values and ethical sys-
                                                                                                                     
global governance regimes on explicitly moral foundations assumes 
that the descriptive and instrumental justifications of the sort that posi-
tivism and pragmatism supply are sufficient jurisprudential models for 
the regimes.481 
 Following the positivist frame of reference leads 
m al of soft law regimes as being devoid of significant authority.482 
Because they are not really “legal” in nature, the argument would run, 
they cannot have the power and persuasiveness of genuine law and thus 
are merely voluntary and recommendatory in nature.483 
 Following the pragmatist frames of reference, the mainstream 
justificatory foundations offered to corporations for endorsing a
plementing global governance regimes are instrumental and function-
alist, centered on the concept that the purpose of the firm is to pursue 
profit maximization.484 Nevertheless, the profit-maximization charac-
terization of the firm has been challenged, if not repudiated.485 
 Why have descriptive and instrumental accounts of soft law tended 
to dominate discussion of it? Descriptive approaches may do so because 
empirical rather than normative grounding for soft law has been 
adopted out of a belief that associating soft law mechanisms with ethics 
would be counterproductive.486 Indeed, “[u]nderlying this conclusion 
might be the view that given th
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te  encountered in the global marketplace and endorsed by manag-
ers, shareholders and the wide range of other corporate stakeholders, 
building on an explicitly ethical foundation would invite distracting 
debate and disagreement.”
ms
overnance believe 
w ideal and in hu-
an
articipants are active in the development of soft law. This im-
ort
 their senior management and 
orp
                                                                                                                     
487 
 As for the instrumental accounts, it may be the case that, most 
commentators, practitioners, and theorists of global g
that they must make a business case for soft law to get corporate buy-
in.488 In other words, the case for soft law must be directly connected to 
the popularly assumed economic purpose of the contemporary, share-
holder-owned corporation—profit maximization.489 
 There are risks, however, in an excessively pragmatic approach to 
justifying soft law regimes. NGOs play an important role in global gov-
ernance discourse. It is important that the concerns of such a group of 
stakeholders are morally grounded in the rule of la
m  rights.490 Pragmatic argument is not irrelevant in discussions of 
the emergence of soft law alongside hard law. The standards against 
which progress is measured, however, must not be limited to empirical 
tests, but must instead be based on normative standards. 
 From a general public policy perspective, it is important that eco-
nomic p
p ance is based on a common public justification tied to the common 
good and the intrinsic value of human rights, not simply because doing 
so will advance economic actors’ narrow instrumental business inter-
ests.491 
 Corporations are certainly integral participants in this discussion, 
because it is their conduct that needs to be altered for progress to come 
about in emerging soft law initiatives.492 Further, shareholders and 
owners will demand justification for incorporating soft law initiatives 
into the corporation’s operations from
c orate boards of directors.493 Thus, it is necessary for management 
to answer the crucial question whether endorsing and implementing 
voluntary soft law initiatives is justified to boards and shareholders for 
whose investments they are stewards.494 
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 One might suppose that, because soft law regimes have been widely 
embraced by the business community, the issue of justification is moot 
from a corporate perspective.495 Nevertheless, this is not the case, as 
there is a great difference between endorsing soft law initiatives and ac-
tually implementing them, notwithstanding whatever persuasive, prag-
matic, and strategic reasons exist for their corporate support.496 When 
ll is
ble only with the back-
g 
                                                                                                                     
a  considered, what matters most is implementation in action—not 
commendation in words—which involves making tough decisions about 
allocating resources, formulating strategic plans, and running daily 
business affairs.497 
 Ultimately, the vital issue is whether the justificatory foundation of 
soft law regimes will stand up under the empirical pressures of corpo-
rate strategic planning and everyday operations when the difficult prac-
tical implications of implementation surface.498 
 Viewing the matter from the standpoint of positivist assumptions, 
translating soft law initiatives into action is proba
in of legal sanctions.499 This view explains the motivation of draft 
“[n]orms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with regard to human rights.”500 It is also 
implicit in NGO critiques of the UN framework.501 
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should carry out some level of human rights due diligence. As presently writ-
ten, the draft Guiding Principles effectively make corporate human rights 
due diligence a voluntary tool for business. In so doing, the Guiding Princi-
ples speak only to those companies that are willing to ensure their activities 
respect human rights. Those companies—a small minority—then face an 
unlevel playing field, as other companies may choos
man rights due diligence. A level playing field would be facilitated by States 
requiring human rights due diligence in clear terms. 
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 As we have seen, since positivism fails to provide an adequate justi-
ficatory model, by default the received model on which soft law regimes 
often rest is a pragmatic, instrumental jurisprudence model grounded 
akeholder model 
d appearance of structural injus-
tice, the rule of law and human rights remain reliable normative 
                                                                                                                     
on: (1) an appeal to conventionally understood business interests (for 
instance, profit maximization); and (2) an appeal to the “governance 
deficit” —the notion that global problems are not capable of being 
handled by states alone.502 
 Regarding the first point, there is no question that demonstrating 
a course of action’s profitability is a strong practical justification for 
enlisting compliance with soft law by business enterprises.503 The issue 
remains whether such a demonstration is possible or can be plausibly 
presented when the requisite costs and benefits associated with imple-
mentation are considered.504 Building an explicit moral dimension into 
the global governance regime by seeing it as justified by non-
instrumental respect of rule of law and human rights is consistent with 
the shift away from the shareholder, and toward the st
of corporate governance.505 Under such a view, corporate management 
is responsible for the rational deployment of intrinsically valuable 
goods (for example, human rights), with profitmaking as a predictable 
side-effect, not as the end-all-and-be-all of business.506 
 Regarding the second point, there is no doubt that, as a political 
reality, a course of action in response to the governance deficit is likely 
and perhaps even inevitable.507 Yet, just because the state is relegated to 
one among multiple power players in global governance does not 
mean that all of the rule of law criteria that attended the hard law re-
gime are to be ignored.508 Despite the decentralization, fragmentation, 
privatization, interconnectedness, an
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509 Soft law stands in need of a justificatory basis, namely, a 
common public justification for it, that is oriented toward the global 
common good and human rights.510 
 Concordant with the tradition of natural law theory and law-as-
integrity, a legal naturalist paradigm for globa
 business enterpris
lish ng the moral legitimacy of those norms.511 
A. Rule of Law 
 This section focuses on examining the presuppositions of global 
governance as an idea, and in particular, how that idea relates to the 
concept of the rule of law. The rule of law ideal asserts the primacy of 
law over the arbitrary exercise of political or economic power by using 
law to tame power.512 It values the protections of the citizen from the 
arbitrary actions of the government or business enterprises by making 
all of them and their relationships subject to impersonal and impartial 
law.513 The rule of law ideal also maintains the primacy of universalism 
over particularism thr
in iduals coming before the law—whether in public or in private in-
stitutional contexts—are treated as individuals, divorced from their so-
cial characteristics.514 
 A normative commitment to the rule of law implies a commitment 
to the principle of relations being governed by law, not power.515 It also 
implies a willingness to accept the limitations and constraints of work-
ing within the law, in specific instances if necessary, against individual 
notions of just or illegitimate outcome. Fide
go rnance regimes, international laws, and institutions must be re-
quired of and demonstrated not only by all states, but also by corpora-
tions and other economic participants.516 
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 Cherry-picking norms and law for instrumental aims or in a dis-
play of unbridled discretionism is incompatible with using those norms 
and laws to urge compliance by others. Logic dictates that the right to 
given to those cor-
inking.521 Among such ideas are those of 
forth. It is not possible for a regulative principle actually to be realized 
in the course of actual events. Consequently, critics of Kant’s philoso-
                                                                                                                     
demand respect for the rule of law should only be 
porations, states, and organizations who seek to uphold the rule of law 
ideal themselves.517 
1. Rethinking Rule of Law as a Regulative Principle 
 The concept of a regulative principle or ideal, attributable to Im-
manuel Kant, is helpful in clarifying the meaning of rule of law in the 
global governance context. In Critique of Pure Reason, his epistemologi-
cal tour de force, Kant ventured to establish what we are able to know and 
how we can know it.518 In doing so, Kant demonstrated the way that our 
observation of the world around us must be bound together and organ-
ized on the basis of certain basic ideas and concepts.519 These basic 
concepts, such as the idea of cause and effect, operate to shape our 
knowledge and understanding, and without them our experience of 
the world would collapse into an incomprehensible morass of stimuli 
and sensations.520 Kant argued that some ideals are unattainable, yet 
serve a key function in our th
truth, goodness, and beauty.522 Our efforts to approach such ideals ex-
ert a profound influence on our actions, and our regard for them plays 
a vital role in the critical capacity that we exercise in accepting some 
views and rejecting others.523 
 It is in Critique of Pure Reason that Kant sets forth the notion of a 
regulative principle which, as an ideal, is a specific, singular concept 
that exemplifies the perfection of some action, process, or object.524 
For instance, an ideal legal order would be fair, treat all citizens as 
equals, resolve disputes in an objective and enlightened way, and so 
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phy attack it for laying emphasis upon states of affairs that are in fact 
inaccessible or unattainable.525 But such a charge does not appreciate 
e r
 Contradictions arise when one adopts a maxim 
ch
 
rve
     
th ole that ideas play in constituting the possibility of our understand-
ing reality in the first place.526 
 A principle is regulative, as opposed to constitutive, when it is un-
achievable yet able to guide, balance, and mediate our actions in prac-
tical matters.527 A regulative principle constitutes an ideal to aim for, 
and by which we are put in a position to measure our progress.528 Ac-
cording to Kant, regulative principles come into play in reconciling 
conflicts that reason itself generates.529 This occurs in the case of the 
antinomies of pure reason. As maxims of our thought, regulative prin-
ciples stem from our interest in gaining a potential perfection of 
knowledge about some object.530 By contrast, constitutive principles 
dictate how things themselves exist, derived from our insight into their 
fundamental nature.531
su  as “everything must have a cause” as a constitutive rather than a 
regulative principle.532 
 As distinguished from setting goals, which carry with them some 
expectation of attaining results, the formulation of ideals does not ne-
cessitate any commitment to actually bringing about or realizing any-
thing. Whereas goals have the potential to be achieved, they can also 
produce underachievement, leading to disillusionment and frustration. 
Since ideals are not staked upon an actual attainment of results, they
se  to focus upon moving toward an unattainable end-state rather 
than—as with goals—focusing upon an arbitrarily posited outcome.533 
 Within the ideal realm, Kant contends that separate ideals do not 
necessarily contradict one another.534 Thus, we may go in pursuit of 
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composite ideals, established when multiple ideals are assembled to-
gether. These sorts of composite ideals enable the negotiation of diverse 
ideals alongside each other simultaneously. In this way, we may aim for 
m
’s sense discussed above), and 
then discuss the significance of that idea for the question of the moral 
es.537 
                                                                                                                     
so e state of affairs more acceptable to all. Of course we do not live in 
an ideal realm, and thus conflicts arise among ideals all the time.535 
 Although global governance may possess numerous beneficial fea-
tures,536 it nevertheless remains questionable in terms of its capability 
to protect and promote the international rule of law, which would seem 
to presuppose some deeper authoritativeness or legitimacy. Accord-
ingly, it is necessary to clarify the concept of an international rule of law 
(understood as a regulative idea in Kant
authority of global governance regim
2. Understanding the Rule of Law 
 The problem of providing an adequate account of the rule of law 
is among the most important issues that global governance and inter-
national law must address.538 Among the various interpretations of the 
rule of law, the more widely accepted range is across the so-called “thin” 
versus “thick” spectrum, accompanied also by the “rule-by-law” idea.539 
At one end of the spectrum, the “thin” or “formal” conception holds 
that the rule of law merely requires that law be publicly declared, apply 
only prospectively, and accomplish generality, equality, and a reason-
able degree of predictability.540 Beyond that, except for sharing an op-
position to the arbitrary exercise of power, thin conceptions do not at-
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tribute any particular requirements with respect to the content of 
law.541 At the other end of the spectrum, “thick” or “substantive” con-
ceptions deem the rule of law to entail protections for individual rights 
and to incorporate substantive considerations of justice.542 Under the 
“rule-by-law” conception, the idea of the rule of law stands in contrast 
 th
nition that 
 co
s us 
 th
                                                                                                                     
to e discretionary rule of men, which is associated with abuse of 
power by government officials.543 
 Regarding the thin and thick distinction, it may be helpful to un-
derstand it in the way that mathematics treats dimensions. We can ac-
knowledge the multidimensional character of the rule of law, noting 
that the thicker conceptions differ from the thinner ones by virtue of 
additional “coordinates” being added. Consequently as one moves to a 
“higher” (“thicker”) dimension, the “lower” (“thinner”) dimensions are 
not discarded but instead remain intact.544 As one scholar similarly ar-
ticulates, “[s]ubstantive theories are typically built on the back of for-
mal ones.”545 Additionally, in making comparisons amongst the various 
candidate conceptions, it is good to bear in mind the admo
“a mmon critique of those who claim to articulate ‘thin’ theories is 
that substantive elements have been included by stealth.”546 
 This Article contends that a rule of law obtains only where ac-
tions—including not only those acts of sovereign states and their agents, 
but also those of diverse economic actors in international institutions—
are constrained by the regulative idea of law. This argument return
to e exceedingly challenging question of what law is, which was raised 
earlier in the discussion of alternative jurisprudential paradigms.547 
 For the instant purpose, it is useful to clarify the function of inter-
national law, which involves three concrete points. First, international 
law’s function is to attain an end state desired by those whose conduct 
 
2004). One scholar suggests that the thin versus 
thic entric circles, with the inner circle containing 
core edded within a thick rule of law 
fram
ee, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 118–122. 
541 See id. at 93. 
542 See id. at 92. 
543 See id. at 92–93. 
544 Tamanaha, supra note 10, at 91. 
545 Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law? 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 331, 341 
(2008); see Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, in Asian Discourses of Rule of 
Law 1, 5–6 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 
k conceptions may be visualized as conc
 components of a thin rule of law and itself emb
ework. Peerenboom, supra, at 5–6. 
546 Chesterman, supra note 545, at 341. 
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is governed by the authority of that law.548 Second, international law 
functions to bring about justice within a wide array of instances of hu-
man, state, and institutional interaction.549 Arguably, one persistent 
threat is the detachment of this key function of international law from 
the non-instrumental concept of law. As a consequence, this view in-
stead considers law purely as an instrument for policy, used to impose 
the will of the more powerful components of the international order 
(whether sovereign states, powerful multinational corporations, the 
ultra-rich, et cetera).550 Third, international law functions to resolve 
transnational political, economic, and social conflicts.551 It does this by 
establishing coherent boundaries as to what conduct people, states, and 
institutions can expect from one another.552 In this way, international 
law continually evolves in providing ways to establish a state of equilib-
um
 in civil activities, one private party sues an-
he
                                                                                                                     
ri  in response to deviations from the norms that have been estab-
lished.553 
 The rule of law is guaranteed in the international context only if 
those harmed by noncompliance possess some means of redress against 
those who have broken the rules.554 Here, the violation of law is con-
ceived as an abuse of power. While the “vertical” sovereign abuse of 
power has traditionally been a central focus of rule of law conceptions, 
the idea of the rule of law need not be restricted to vertical sovereign 
abuse of power, but expanded to encompass other “horizontal” abuses 
of power as well.555 After all,
ot r where the gravamen of complaint is that they, as a co-equal citi-
zen, have broken the law.556 
 One benefit of conceiving of the rule of law this way is that it 
avoids the problem of granting states a “monopoly” to handle the en-
 
548 See, e.g., Tamanaha, supra note 10, at 130 (explaining voluntary adherence to 
glob
Rule of Law, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 553, 554–55 
(19
c Ip, Reconceptualising the International Legal Regime: Law, Politics, and Institu-
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4, 5 ing rule of law principles applied equally to government and private 
acti
al economic norms because of states’ desire to create a predictable commercial land-
scape). 
549 See William W. Bishop, The International 
61). 
550 See Tamanaha, supra note 10, at 136. 
551 See Eri
, 2 Nw. Interdisc. L. Rev. 57, 67 (2009). 
552 See id. 
553 See Tamanaha, supra note 10, at 127–28. 
554 Cf. Towards Operationalizing, supra note 200, ¶ 86 (explaining the need for access to 
remedy in an international regulatory framework). 
555 C
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556 See id. at 7. 
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forcement of law.557 Whereas the idea of separation of powers has 
proved an effective balance to over-concentration of sovereign power, 
xpa
ociety whether in the short or long 
rm
forms; whether the collaboration is a convenient shield for deflecting 
                                                                                                                     
e nding the rule of law to other forms of governance provides new 
avenues for separation of power to gain currency in the global con-
text.558 
 Rule of law is an end state of affairs where law as a system of norms 
is deployed in a way that justifies its existence and authority over a 
community of persons.559 The rule of law is opposed to arbitrary use of 
power (whether that power is state or non-state); it entails that some 
measure of certainty obtains in s
te ; it is a system of general norms that enables people to foresee how 
they will interact, or choose not to interact, with other citizens and with 
institutions public and private.560 
 It should be clear from the discussion so far that rule of law is not 
an all-or-nothing idea. Moreover, emerging global governance devices, 
such as public-private collaboration, that blur traditional distinctions 
sanctified under “hard” public international law categorizations, are 
not in themselves necessarily good or bad things.561 In each case it be-
comes important to scrutinize questions such as: whether a collabora-
tive governance arrangement becomes in practice a form of “corpora-
tocracy;”562 whether checks and balances exist within the collaborative 
relationship to restrain despotism in private and nongovernmental 
 
557 See, e.g., Tamanaha, supra note 10, at 116–17 (noting ways in which states could be 
held liable to their subjects for abuses of power). 
558 Cf. Ruggie, supra note 204, at 833–35 (identifying IGOs such as OECD, as well as 
self-regulation, as restraining corporate action where states do not do so directly). 
559 Cf. Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 Queen’s L.J. 259, 
270–71 (2005) (“If legal norms can be shown to have intrinsic and autonomous value, their 
authority needs no further justification in terms of some greater good or political ideal.”). 
560 Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 72 (1944). 
561 See, e.g., Christopher G. Bradley, Partner Capture in Public International Organizations, 44 
Akron L. Rev. 261, 271 (2011) (using the privately-funded U.N. Foundation as an example 
of a public-private partnership that enhances the public partner’s ability to reach its goals, 
but also leaves that partner susceptible to “capture” by agents of the private partner). 
562 See Corporatocracy, Oxford Dictionaries, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
american_english/corporatocracy (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) (defining corporatocracy as “a 
society or system that is governed or controlled by corporations”). In some cases, a govern-
ment state is effectively dominated by and for a powerful corporation rather than by and for 
its citizens. See Jennifer Green & Beth Stephens, Human Rights Litigation and the 
Corporate Accountability Movement 1 (2008), available at http://www.reports-and-mat 
erials.org/Jennifer-Green-and-Beth-Stephens-commentary.pdf. Multinational firms can relo-
cate their operations from a country if its government adopts policies contrary to the firm’s 
interests. See id. 
110 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:39 
responsibility, passing off blame to the another party; and whether 
NGOs that are parties to the syndicate, are themselves being held ac-
countable;563 and whether a collaborative governance scheme is a front 
t the product of human will; that law 
n 
bje
                                                                                                                     
for “crony capitalism.”564 
3. Taking a Non-Instrumental Viewpoint 
 According to Brian Tamanaha, the non-instrumental conception 
of law holds that “the content of law is, in some sense, given; that law is 
immanent; that the process of law-making is not a matter of creation 
but one of discovery; that law is no
has a kind of autonomy and internal integrity; that law is, in some 
sense, objectively determined.”565 
 This perspective contrasts sharply with the view of legal pragma-
tism, discussed earlier, which sees law as an instrumental process de-
termined by non-legal factors, and whose legitimacy comes entirely 
from its ability to serve social purposes.566 To recapitulate what was said 
earlier about pragmatism: on such an account, whether one is consider-
ing a domestic or international context, all that law can ever amount to 
is policy.567 The instrumental view conceives of the nature of law as 
simply a decision process, not as a coherent system of rules.568 To the 
extent that law engages rules it does so only to promote the utilitaria
o ctive of generating desired outcomes.569 The authority of such 
norms derives from their effectiveness in realizing such outcomes.570 
 
563 Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy 
of Global Governance, 36 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1011, 1011 (2011) (“NGOs need to be com-
posed and governed accountably in order to legitimate their role in global governance.”). 
564 E.g., Afshin Molavi, Buying Time in Tehran: Iran and the China Model, 83 Foreign Aff. 
9, 10 (2004). This can occur when a government extends a privileged group property 
rights in return for the group lending its support to the regime. See id. Typically this occurs 
in corporate arrangements with dictatorships. See id. at 9–10. Such a collaborative regime 
can establish a system of markets and government without relinquishing control from ei-
ther sector. 
565 Tamanaha, supra note 144, at 11. 
566 See supra Part II.B. 
567 Cf. Robb M. LaKritz, Taming a 5,000 Year-Old Dragon: Toward a Theory of Legal Devel-
opment in Post-Mao China, 11 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 237, 250–51 (1997) (recounting the view 
of law under pragmatist influence in early communist China as being subject to instru-
mental aims of rulers). 
568 See id. 
569 See id. 
570 Cf. Robert Justin Lipkin, Conventionalism, Pragmatism, and Constitutional Revolutions, 
21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 645, 654 (1988) (stating judicial pragmatism favors decision-making 
based upon future results rather than precedent). 
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 By contrast, non-instrumental norms are those which ought to be 
respected for their own sake, apart from some desired result or strat-
egy.571 An example of a nonstrategic norm at the heart of the rule of law 
and human rights is one prescribing that citizens are related to each 
other as moral equals, according to which they enjoy what Dworkin calls 
the “right to treatment as an equal.”572 Likewise, the familiar require-
ments of the rule of law which curb arbitrariness and discretionism, 
such as nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali, and the 
Kant’s concept 
of a human person as a member of a universal legal and moral com-
munity, and the n 5 
ality Towards Legitimacy 
soft law norms for sustainability and human rights is a function of the 
legitimacy of those rules as perceived by the norm-conforming partici-
                                                                                                                     
demand that laws be published, non-retroactive, clear, ascertainable, 
and so on, are all of a non-instrumental character.573 
 The existence of nonstrategic norms is what enables one to distin-
guish between just and unjust uses of force or coercion. In this sense, 
while they are similar to moral principles, they are nevertheless internal 
to law. It should be noted as well in response to the radical skepticism 
mentioned earlier, that any theoretical approach that denies the possi-
bility of objective moral truth cannot serve to justify an international 
rule of law.574 In this sense, the rule of law applied to the global realm 
finds legitimation on the basis of universal ideas such as 
otion of a cosmopolitan democracy.57
B. Beyond Leg
1. The Concept of Legitimacy 
 We can distinguish between the legal positivist’s coercion, the legal 
pragmatist’s self-interest and consequentialism, and the legal natural-
ist’s universal legitimacy as alternative grounds for obedience to law.576 
Precisely because no international government exists to enforce them, 
the compliance of corporations, IGOs, NGOs, and states with global 
 
571 See Tamanaha, supra note 144, at 11. 
572 Dworkin, supra note 290, at 227–29. 
573 See Walter F. Murphy, Transitions to Constitutional Democracy and the Fate of Deposed 
Despots, 81 Denv. U. L. Rev. 415, 438–39 (2003). 
574 See Bernard Dobranski, New Lawyers for a New Century: Legal Excellence and Moral Clar-
ity: The Founding of Ave Maria School of Law, 36 U. Tol. L. Rev. 55, 58 (2004). 
575 See Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward 
Cosmopolitan Democracy 120–21 (2008). 
576 See Hurd, supra note 68, at 379. 
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pants.577 That is, they are regarded as proper or appropriate by the ac-
tors to whom they are addressed within the governance scheme. 
 If the source of legitimacy is institutions (either formal organiza-
tions or recurring and stable patterns of behavior), then those institu-
tions indicate the existence of an international authority, even in the 
absence of world government. For “the international system clearly ex-
hibits some kind of order in which patterns repeat, institutions accrete, 
and practices are stable.”578 
 What might lead one to suppose that global economic governance 
regimes generate not simply “soft law” policies or purely discretionary 
and unenforceable norms, but morally grounded obligations, specifi-
cally for non-state actors such as corporations? After all, conceiving of 
corporations as juridical agents accountable under the rule of law and 
human rights is a relatively new idea.579 
 One way to answer this question is to query: how does the position 
of business enterprises, as private entities, compare to that of states, as 
public entities? If states have rule of law obligations, and if states are 
bound to protect human rights, do private corporations have these 
kinds of duties as well? Are the sort of characteristics that lead one to 
attribute responsibility for upholding the rule of law and human rights 
to states, and that lead states to assume that responsibility, similar in 
morally relevant ways to the characteristics that business enterprises 
have? 
 Discourse about the international legal obligations that states have 
often neglects to acknowledge that many obligations, such as human 
rights obligations, while today reflected in positive international law, 
actually stem from deeper normative or moral roots.580 In addition, 
they are in significant respects voluntary, which is a characteristic often 
passed over by positivist views.581 A signal of their voluntary nature is 
the reality that while legal experts currently refer to the international 
legal obligations of states, most of these obligations arise from volun-
                                                                                                                      
577 See id. at 396–98. Mark Suchman defined legitimacy as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Id. at 387. 
578 See id. at 400. 
579 See, e.g., Arat, supra note 40, at 5–6 (explaining how the framework for the current 
human rights regime has only been in place since World War II). 
580 See Hurd, supra note 68, at 387. 
581 See id. at 387–88. 
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tary agreements, such as treaties and conventions, and in fact rely upon 
the willing participation of a state for their implementation.582 
 This means that the obligation of states to respect and uphold the 
rule of law is predominantly a moral obligation that, over time, has 
come to be seen as something that is apt to gain legitimacy by being ac-
corded a legal status.583 It should be noted that the decision to extend 
legal status to international human rights was not something that was 
itself legally mandated.584 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
was an initiative that was voluntarily proposed and adopted by the re-
spective states that endorsed it as an international legal instrument.585 
 Corporations are akin to states in possessing the power to oppose 
or promote sustainability and to honor or disregard human rights.586 
The point is brought out in John Ruggie’s report that “there are few if 
any internationally recognized rights business cannot impact—or be 
perceived to impact—in some manner. Therefore, companies should 
consider all such rights.”587 Moreover, the sustainability and human 
rights violations committed by business enterprises are similar in type 
and seriousness to violations that states have historically carried out.588 
Corporations have acquired this power as a consequence of the rise of 
globalization and the governance gaps that have accompanied that 
trend.589 
                                                                                                                      
582 E.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of Interna-
tional Law, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 488 (2005) (“A first defining characteristic of interna-
tional treaty law is the voluntary nature of the legal obligation it imposes. Treaties operate 
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583 See T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of 
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585 See id. 
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ship, human rights, peace, and socioeconomic justice. See Stephen Sterling, Sustain-
able Education: Re-visioning Learning and Change 16–17 (2001). 
587 Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 29, ¶ 52. 
588 Cf. Daniel Baer, Businesses and Transnational Corporations Have a Responsibility to Respect 
Human Rights, HumanRights.gov ( June 16, 2011), http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/06/ 
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(“In States that violate human rights, it will be more difficult for businesses to respect those 
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dermine the enjoyment of human rights, or because States involve businesses in their own 
human rights violations.”). 
589 See Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 29, ¶ 17. 
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 It is also significant to note that, like governments, business enter-
prises not only have the capacity to violate human rights, but also the 
resources to institutionalize compliance with human rights within their 
operations.590 As with states, business enterprises are able to curtail 
human rights violations and implant due regard for human rights in 
their dealings with business partners. 
2. Global Common Good 
 It is important to consider the relation between the rule of law and 
the multiplicity of “publics” that are relevant to the idea of a common 
public justification that would be aimed at the common good. In global 
economic governance, a substantial part of the process of rulemaking 
connected with sustainability and human rights standards is quite re-
mote from any strictly democratic process.591 The idea of the rule of 
law, however, presupposes the existence of some group of persons—
some public, that is—in whose name the law stands.592 According to the 
rule of law, legal norms must be representative of the entire society and 
be addressed to issues of concern to society per se, as opposed to 
merely pertaining to matters of personal interest to people or groups 
that create the rules.593 
 Because the aspect of public legitimacy is related to the democratic 
process of law-making, there are of course limits to this being realized 
at the international level.594 After all, there is no global democracy in 
place in our world.595 Although there is a tendency of global economic 
governance to extend the range of actors involved in formulating rules, 
there appears to be no immediate likelihood that transnational gov-
ernance will institute processes that closely resemble democratic pro-
cedures within states.596 
 As more and more sector-based and non-state agents assume roles 
in global economic governance regimes, the question naturally arises 
whether such parties are authentic representatives of the public.597 
                                                                                                                      
590 See Further Steps, supra note 202, ¶¶ 91–95. 
591 See Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multi-
national Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order, 18 Ind. J. 
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Also, we may wonder whether it makes sense to speak of a decision, 
along with the rules and principles upon which it is rendered, as stand-
ing in the name of an entire community when its actual audience may 
be narrower.598 
 Accordingly, there is a need for naturalist cosmopolitan jurispru-
dence to provide an account of the common good in global society as 
an anchor for legitimacy. Against the backdrops of pluralism and indi-
vidualism across many cultures, it seems difficult to construct a shared 
notion of the common good.599 
 Nevertheless, the naturalist framework presented in this Article 
provides a starting point for a trans-cultural idea of the common 
good.600 By indicating the basis of what it is to be human, naturalism 
holds promise for carving out a space within which to find common 
ground.601 Under the naturalistic conception, human rights are the 
moral rights that all human beings possess in virtue of being human.602 
The natural capacities for reason and the freedom and autonomy that 
we possess are fundamental with respect to our dignity as human be-
ings.603 Human rights serve to safeguard and to further advance that 
dignity.604 Moreover, “[t]he basic goods of human nature are the goods 
of a rational creature.”605 Human rights command respect and protec-
tion for the most basic and urgent claims on the moral spectrum, and 
they correlate to similarly urgent moral obligations. 
 In seeking to understand the concept of the common good, there 
are a variety of meanings associated with the term.606 For purposes of 
the present discussion, the common good is more than the competing 
interests of individuals and various cultures and more than the compos-
ite interests of special interest groups such as NGOs. It is the good we 
have in common—the communal conditions necessary for the virtuous 
pursuit of human fulfillment, flourishing, and perfection by all in soci-
ety.607 Ultimately, the common good is the aggregation of collaborative 
                                                                                                                      
598 Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, in Moral Universalism 
and Pluralism 167, 174 (Henry R. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2009). 
599 Michael Novak, Free Persons and the Common Good 21 (1989). 
600 See supra Part II.C.3. 
601 See supra text accompanying notes 411–415. 
602 See supra text accompanying notes 387–388. 
603 See Novak, supra note 599, at 75–77. 
604 See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 388, at 71. 
605 Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 171, 176 (2008). 
606 See Novak, supra note 599, at 175–88. 
607 See id. at 186–87. Similarly, Vatican II defines the common good as “the sum of 
those conditions of the social life whereby men, families and associations more adequately 
and readily may attain their own perfection.” Gaudium et Spes, supra note 389, ¶ 74. 
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initiatives and shared restraints by which society helps everyone achieve 
what in the end only each individual can accomplish for himself: shap-
ing a good will and constituting an authentically human self by freely 
choosing to actualize that good every time one is given the chance and 
responsibility to do so.608 
 Rather than supposing that the foremost problems of cosmopolitan 
jurisprudence are the technical ones of designing the right kind of le-
gal architecture, of setting up the right mechanisms for coordinating 
and apportioning extraterritorial jurisdiction across states, or thinking 
that technical development will automatically create a prosperity that 
brings about justice and respect for human dignity, we need to address 
linkages of values shared across massive geographical and cultural 
chasms, as well as across barriers erected by income and wealth dispari-
ties. It is likely that significant shared values can be identified.609 
 Such a trans-cultural linkage of values can be seen in the existence 
of basic, incommensurable human goods identified by John Finnis and 
others.610 The incommensurability of these goods means we cannot 
rationally measure one against another.611 In treating basic goods as 
incommensurable, two things are accomplished. First, although hu-
                                                                                                                      
608 See Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter: Fides et Ratio ¶ 13, available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_151 
01998_fides-et-ratio_en.html (“[H]ow could it be an exercise of true freedom to refuse to 
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tentialism Is a Humanism 29 ( John Kulka ed., Carol Macomber trans., Yale Univ. Press 
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world, he is responsible for everything he does.”). 
609 Donaldson, supra note 189, at 53–54. 
610 Finnis, supra note 453, at 115. It should be noted that there is a degree of resem-
blance between this conception of basic incommensurable goods and the idea of “hyper-
norms” as incorporated into integrative social contracts theory (ISCT). See generally Tho-
mas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics: Integra-
tive Social Contracts Theory, 19 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 252 (introducing ISCT). ISCT offers a 
communitarian account of economic ethics. Id. at 254. So in this regard, although contrac-
tualist in its basic structure, as offering an account about how we reach agreement con-
cerning authentic norms of business ethics, ISCT can be understood as drawing upon a 
naturalistic paradigm at least for one of its cornerstone concepts as regards the basis for 
making judgments about which authentic norms are legitimate or illegitimate, that is, 
passing or flunking the hypernorms test, respectively. See id. at 265. In other words, ISCT 
presupposes that there are certain correct hypernorms that we ought to follow in judging 
whether local norms are finally morally right. The hypernorms are categorized as follows. 
Structural: engaging the duty to develop and fulfill obligations in connection with social 
structures that are efficient in achieving necessary social goods; Procedural: involving 
rights of voice and exit essential to support microsocial consent; Substantive: relating to 
promise-keeping and respect for human dignity. Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 445, at 
53. 
611 See Finnis, supra note 453, at 115. 
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mans are free to choose, some moral absolutes remain.612 While one 
possesses freedom as a human being, that freedom is not absolute (al-
though of course one is always free in the deepest existential sense to 
reject morality).613 One may not purposely assail a basic good like 
health or friendship.614 Second, we eliminate right away pragmatist cal-
culations of values that might license one to “do evil that good may 
come of it.”615 
Conclusion 
 This Article was stimulated by the need for a jurisprudential para-
digm for global economic governance that goes beyond the descriptive 
domain of empirical positivist perspectives and beyond the instrumen-
talist spheres of politics and economics. To that end, this Article has 
shown that what is as stake is not only knowing how global economic 
governance originates and how it in fact operates, but also whether and 
on what justificatory ground global actors should respect it. As demon-
strated, three competing jurisprudential paradigms are central to that 
discussion: positivism, pragmatism, and naturalism. Each contains 
strong emotive and political reverberations, and each is able to elicit 
passionately radical debate and counterargument. At root, the three 
paradigms stem from divergent philosophical traditions of thinking 
about the nature of law and, by extension, about the essential character 
of international law and global governance. The Article has shown, 
however, that much of the contemporary discourse on global economic 
governance tends to proceed from positivistic and pragmatic viewpoints 
that, while geared toward explaining and designing strategies accord-
ing to the perceived dictates of legal, political and economic forces, or 
toward power and market-driven processes as they continuously exert 
influence in the international arena, still fail to address the legitimacy 
beyond the legality of that governance. 
 Thus, the positivistic viewpoint postures itself as purely empirical 
and therefore neutral and value-free, and its analysis tends to center 
upon thinking in de facto power terms. Upon such an assumption, we 
should support efforts to strengthen global economic governance be-
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cause we are, as a matter of brute fact, coerced into doing so. We are 
compelled not from some supranational command of a sovereign, 
and not from any force of moral law, but rather by a logic that as-
sumes that nothing can be in everyone’s interests because interests 
are always in conflict. According to the pragmatic viewpoint, we 
should fortify global economic governance because of the anticipated 
good political or economic outcomes that will ensue. 
 By contrast, the tradition of natural law sees human communities 
as bound together by common values, which can be derived primarily 
from the application of human reason. According to this interpretive 
framework, international order of the sort sought by global economic 
governance is a good that follows logically from basic human sensibili-
ties. It is compelling because it is good, rather than being good because 
it is compelled under the positivistic framework or compelling under 
the pragmatist framework. 
 Making a case for a global economic governance regime for sus-
tainability and human rights, equipped with a system of sanctions, 
that would serve as an overarching institution, encompassing corpora-
tions, states, NGOs, IGOs, and civil society, has not been the aim of 
this Article. Instead, the Article has sought to provide an alternative 
conceptual framework for justifying, in non-instrumental normative 
terms, the decentralized and fragmented soft law regimes that con-
tinue to emerge. In addition, this Article has argued that, no matter 
how dissimilar to traditional state-centric regimes the emerging gov-
ernance regimes become, they still presuppose and derive their le-
gitimacy from the rule of law and human rights, properly understood 
as regulative ideals. While informal reputational rewards and penal-
ties play an important role as substitutes for formal state sanctions, of 
greater need than these is intrinsic motivation to comply with soft law 
norms. The cultivation of this intrinsic motivation, which extends be-
yond law into the arena of virtue, should be considered a common 
objective that economic participants should strive toward in the field 
of civil regulations (dealing with sustainability broadly understood) 
and human rights. This involves an acknowledgment of the non-
coercive power of “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations.”616 Indeed, such a 
                                                                                                                      
 
616 Stephan Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables, 36 Int’l Org. 185, 186 (1982); Stephan D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime 
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in International Regimes 1, 2 (Stephan D. 
Krasner ed., 1985). The definition is consistent with Keohane and Nye’s definition: “sets of 
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convergence can already be seen in the sense that a normative struc-
ture already is in place behind the international human rights regime 
that has existed for decades.617 The natural law frame of reference has 
a unique and vital contribution to make here. 
 Whether addressees will embrace the normative content of the 
sustainability and human rights governance framework depends as 
much on the power of normative ideas as on the socio-political and 
economic conditions that are functional to the governance gaps 
which the soft law is positioning itself to solve. 
 This Article has shown that it is not a necessary feature of law that 
centralized sanctions exist to address the noncompliant behaviors of 
states and other actors in the field of business and human rights. 
More important than focusing exclusively on descriptive, coercive, 
and instrumental features of law, and seeking some overarching sanc-
tions system that would necessitate pledging allegiance to a global su-
per-sovereign, is cultivating awareness of the importance of non-
instrumental internal dispositions of actors to respect the normative 
obligatory nature of norms aimed at the global common good. On 
the other hand, designing regimes consistent with the global trends of 
interconnectivity, decentralization, and dispersion of authority should 
be a common objective for all the actors—states, IGOs, NGOs, and 
business enterprises—to pursue.618 A focus on dialogue within a 
shared intellectual framework—one that is clearly and uniquely ex-
hibited by a naturalistic jurisprudence that accords intrinsic value to 
                                                                                                                      
governing arrangements” that include “networks of rules, norms and procedures that 
regularize behavior and control its effects.” Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Power 
and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 19 (1977). The regime concept 
of those days was distinctly state-centered so that, as Ruggie described, “whatever roles 
transnational actors might play in the context of international regimes . . . were filtered 
through the prisms of their influence on governmental and intergovernmental policy 
processes.” Ruggie, supra note 57, at 501. Arguably, the original definition remains relevant 
even though in the contemporary global situation, albeit still state-based, transnational or 
global actors—including civil society organizations—have gained more prominence as 
global actors. 
617 Cf. Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 Int’l Org. 599, 
613–14 (1986) (analogizing governance regimes to markets that are created by demand). 
618 Some scholars argue that corporations should assume responsibilities associated 
with governments and international organizations. For instance, Nien-Hê Hsieh insists that 
corporations should have responsibility to promote well-ordered institutions in societies 
where they operate that are not well-ordered. Nien-Hê Hsieh, Does Global Business Have a 
Responsibility to Promote Just Institutions?, 19 Bus. Ethics Q. 251, 267–69 (2009). See generally 
Alice de Jonge, Transnational Corporations and International Law: Bringing TNCs Out of the 
Accountability Vacuum, 7 Critical Persp. on Int’l Bus. 66 (2011) (identifying weaknesses 
in international legal oversight of transnational corporations). 
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human rights and the rule of law—is essential to the imperative pro-
ject of bridging governance gaps. 
